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INTRODUCTION
From the United States Senate to Columbus

Circle~he

national question of the year has been tlWhat are we going to
do about the Negro-White problem?ft

The solutions suggested

have been as varied as the types of people making them.

But

few of these solutions have ever gone to the roots of the problem; few have looked to Uthe science of ultimates" for help.
According to i ts definition philosophy is t'the science
of all things as known through their ultimate causes."

It is

the purpose of philosophy, therefore, to give final and ultimate answers.

Today a presentation of philosophical principles

as they affect the so-called race question is especially

neces~

sary because most American ,thinkers do not truly understand
the relation of social problems -- and especially the problem
of race relations -- to the science that searches the ultimate
causes o! all things.

Everyone admits that the race question

is a social problem; few are willing to admit that it is first
of all a philosophical problem.
~,

The axiom, agere sequitur

indicates that the value of any action will be only as

true and solid as the principles from which it flows.
answer

One's

to the race question depends entirely upon one's phi-

losophy or lack of it.

The false answers to the question

come from false philosophical principles or from a denial of
true principles.

If Americans neglect or abuse the true

basis of their problem, they will never arrive at a true
1

2

understanding that will lead them to the reasonable and only
satisfactory solution.
Our chief purpose is to present the principles of Scholastic philosophy as a basis for a true understanding of the
problem of Negro-White relationships in the United States.
This basis begins with the fact of God's existence and proceeds to a study of the nature and consequent dignity of the
human person, who thus becomes the subject of certain inalienable rights.
In this thesis we are not dealing with theological proofs
as found in Christian Revelation.

We do not deny the import-

ance of theology in a study of this kind.

Philosophy, after

all, is but the hand-maid of theology; it gives only the beginning for a perfect understanding of our problem.

Theologi-

cal truths are necessary for a perfect understanding because
Christian Revelation perfects manls knowledge about the nature
and operations of God and about manls own value as a human
person.

The truths concerning the Fatherhood of God; the New

Law of Love given to men by Jesus Christ, the second Person of
the Blessed Trinity; and the union in Christ of the members of
His Mystical Body are sublime doctrines definitely related to
the question of race relations and they should be studied and
appreciated more than they are.

However, it is necessary for

us to limit ourselves; here we shall present only the beginning of an answer that can be perfected by the truths of
theology.

10"""
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Besides the positive presentation of the principles of
Scholastic philosophy we have as a kind of

corrobora~ve

corol-

lary a negative approach by which we reply to the various
"other answers" to the race question.

We will begin with an

outline of these answers; our replies to them will follow our
positive presentation.

CHAPTER I
THE OTHER ANSWERS

When asked to give an opinion or to answer a question
men frequently forget "the other fellow's viewpoint."

It

is natural for men to think that theirs is the only solution and that other answers are not worthy of consideration.
Lest we seem to fall into this common human failing, we will
begin our thesis with the "other answers"; we will 'show how
other students have treated the so-called race question.
The first group of philosophers who have definite principles affecting race relations are those commonly known as
totalitarian.

The main tenet of these ph1losophers is that

the chosen social group is absolutely autonomous, a kind of
super-individual entity that is superior to other individuals
and distinct from them.

As Ross Hoffman states:

All that goes on in the life
of society, all economic and
cultural activity, all intellectual expression, all associational enterprise, is brought
under the rule of the State •••
made subject to whatever

4

5

regulation the State may choose
to impose. III
From this primum principium they immediately deduce that all
rights depend on the group because a man has value only as a
member of. the group. The main thesis of the totalitarian
philosophers is always the same; the applications of their
thesis differ according to the chosen social groups in which
it is incorporated.
Communism or Classism is a form of totalitarianism that
has set up the proletarian class as the absolutely independent
unit in society.

Communism is not merely a political philoso-

phy but a creed and philosophy of life.

Communism began with

an economic purpose; its aim was to build a new economic
order which would lead to a classless society; in order to
accomplish this, revolution was necessary; private ownership
had to be abolished, property conscripted, the economic aspects of human life subordinated to the rulers of the society,
which is the organ of class domination.

Although Karl Marx,

lROSS Hoffman, The Will tq Freedom, Sheed & Ward, London

1935, 60.

The word "totalitarian" should apply to all forms of philosophy or social living in which all the rights of individuals
are considered as coming from one absolute source. Here it is
a term which must be applied analogously to the completely
group-absolute philosophy. A comparison of the cardinal principles of various totalitarian philosophies will manifest many
points of difference; it is the spirit of totality which motivates them that is the same for all. Philosophically totalitarianism has its roots in the doctrines of Hobbes, Hegel,
Fichte, and Marx. It is the antonym of liberalism, although
it has historically -- and logically -- emerged from the basic
principles of liberalism.

v

the father of Communism, made blind evolutionary matter an

.,

absolute, this theory has produced and given away to a more
mystical absolute -- the proletarian class.

The collectivity

of the proletarians has become the integrating principle of
all social life; it has become the measure of all values:
moral, religious, ethical, economical; the goal and destiny
of each individual.

The relationships based on such acci-

dental qualities as racial differences and physical characteristics have been completely immersed in the classless
society dominated by a dictatorial proletariat.

For the

Communists there is no race problem; there is only a class
problem.
The dictatorship of the State as it developed in Italy
was consciously formed on the proletarian dictatorship.
Italian Fascism replaced the class struggle with international
conflict and hatred, using these as a means of bringing about
the complete autonomy of the State.

Dr. Luigi Sturzo claims

that Benito Mussolini's notion of the complete subordination
of man to the State had for Italy the twofold sense of the
transcendence of the nation and of the resolution of every
social activity into political power, so that not only was the
primacy of politics proclaimed on the basis of the State, but
the latter absorbed into itself every reason of social living
in that every right came from the State to the individuals. 2
2 Dr. Luigi Sturzo, "Nationalism," Race: Nation: Person.
Barnes and Noble, New york, 1944 189=190.

7

.,

This conception of Fascism is in complete accord with Mussolini's definition:

t'Everything is in the State and nothing

human or spiritual exists, far less has value, outside the
state. ,,3
In order to indoctrinate the members of the Fascistic
state force was not enough; education was also necessary.
Therefore, Mussolini monopolized the schools, the sport
activities of the youth, the cinema, the radio, the press,
the labor alliances, the churches; all these he subordinated
to the State by organizing them into one party, his party,
the Fascists' party.

Like Communism the Fascist State became

a philosophy of life that absorbed all values and finally took
upon itself a religious aspect that expressed a morality
based on devotion to the State.

In 1935 Mussolini wrote:

I

The Fascist state, as a higher and
more powerful expression of personality, is a force, but a spiritual
one. It sums up all the manifestations of the moral and intellectual
life of man. Its functions cannot
therefore be limited to those of enforcing order and keeping the peace,
as the liberal doctrine had it. It
is no mere mechanical device for defining the sphere within which the
individual may duly exercise his
supposed rights. The Fascist State
is an inwardly accepted standard
and rule of conduct, a discipline of
the whole person; it permeates t~e
will no less than the intellect.
3 Loc. cit., note 22.
4 Benito Mussolini. Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions.
"Ardita fl Publishers, Rome, 1935, 13

~____------------------------------------------------~o

.,

Fascism became the law-giver, the founder of institutions,

-the

educator, and the promoter of spiritual life.

--

"It aims,

11

Mussolini stated, "at refashioning not only the forms of life
man, his character, and his faith.

but their content

To

achieve this purpose it enforces discipline and uses authority
entering into the soul and ruling with undisputed sway."?
Fascism, as a philosophy, differs from Communism in that
it must depend upon political unity rather then economic
unity.

Yet this difference has only served to emphasize a

common difficulty.

Communism and Fascism have never succeeded

on the sociological , and psychological home front, because they
have been forc·ed to abandon individual interests for the sake
of the class or State.

Their essential problem has been "how

to transform the mechanized dehumanized mass population of an
industrialized State into a true community with a common ethos
and a common faith. ,,6

The philosophies of these two total-

itarian groups have disregarded the differentiating marks
of their individual members; they have both disregarded
racial characteristics and have thereby suffered the "spiritual tl loss of their people.

The National Socialists were

more logical, and philosophically more successful; they developed a more ideal form of totalitarian philosophy; they
copied the corporative structure of the State from Italian

5 Ibid., 14
6 Christopher Dawson. Beyond Politics.
York, 1939, 80.

Sheed and Ward, New

Fascism and then added .the myth of the race as its crowning
glory.
Racism is a race-centric totalitarianism; it makes racial
origin the sole right to admission into the society of ,the
chosen people; it holds racial purity as the summum bonum of
human existence.

Thus, in the racist society there is only

one important problem: the preservation of the pure racial
traits in the individual members.
adopt~d

as the philosophy of private persons who have never

been able to see
nation.

Racism has been generally

~t

fully developed in an entire community or

In Germany, however, racism became identified with

the political doctrines of the ruling Nazi party; later it
developed as a "fo1kish philosophy" that overshadowed every
aspect of German life.
In 1935, Dr. J. Goebbe1s, the Nazi minister of propaganda, wrote, "National Socialism has simplified thinking
for the German nation and brought it back to its earlier and
primitive form.,,7

The meaning of his words is evident to

the most casual observer of Nazi philosophy in action.

The

theory of racial purity simplified for the Nazis not only
their thinking but every phase of their national life.

No

one has described more accurately the principles of Nazi
7 Dr. Joseph Goebbe1s, Wesen und Gestalt des Naziona1sozialismus. Berlin, 1935, 6; quoted by Andrew J. Krzesinski, "The
Church and National Cultures," in Race: Nation: Person, 149.

~------------------~
philosophy than Alfred Rosenberg; his principal theoIY is
that all goodness comes from Aryan purity as revealed in the
8
German race.
In his Der My thus des XX. Jahrhunderts he
states:
••• what we today call science is
the most outstandin§ creation of
the German race ••• Law is that
which Aryan men consider to be
just •••• The God whom we worship
would not exist at all if our
soul and our blood did not exist •
••• Today this inner voice demands
that the Myth of the Blood and
the Myth of t he Soul, rae e and I,
people and personality, blood and
honor must alone, to the exclusion of all e1se, be uncompromisingly upheld and affirmed as long
as we have life in us •••• Today
we see a new faith revealed to
life, the myth of the blood. It
is the religion of the blood that
will replace wonderfully well the
old sacraments, which it has already succeeded largely in supplanting. 9
The race theory of Nazism, therefore, is simplified to a worship of the tlpure blooded man. tI

The moral values of Dr. Rosen

berg's philosophy constitute an eternal principle that makes
right whatever it touches, and it touches every phase of Ger,

man culture.

William

Stapel brought forward this theory

with equal force and clarity when he wrote, tlHuman society
8 The original meaning of"Aryan was "nobleman" or "member of
the upper castes." In the Nazi vocabulary it was taken to
mean "highest type of Caucasian. 11
9 Race: Nation: Person, 9, 10, 12, 143, 313

;"
~

1s naturally based on inequality.

The champion of the New

.,

power must be Germany •••• We are above all other., parallel
to none..

We are the Germans •••• If two Germans live in all

poland, they will be worth more than thirty million Poles,
for they are Germans. lflO
To accompany Rosenberg's "bible of Nazism" Adolph Hitler
wrote his practical handbuch, Mein Kampf.

Here the theories

of race philosophy are put into an emotional, pleading language that has as its purpose the transfer of thought into
action.

Here Nazi philosophy is put on the common-folk level.

Hitler begins with the premise that "the deepest and the ultimate cause for the ruin of the old Reich was found in the
non-recognition of the race problem and its importance for
the historical development of the peopl~."ll

From this the-

ory Hitler gives the reason for his building a new nation of
"pure blooded" Aryans whose motto must be "Race alone counts."
Hitler's very words speak for themselves, "All that is not
race in this world is trash.

All world historical events,

however, are only the expression of the races' instinct of
self-preservation in its good or in its evil meaning.,,12
And again, "Everything in this

wo~ld

can be improved ••• as

10 Quoted by Monseigneur Bressolles. Racisme et Christianisme.
Flammarion, Ed., 26 rue Racine, Paris, 1939, 45.
11 Adolph Hitler. Mein Kampf, t~anslated by John Chamberlain
et al. Reynal and Hitchcock, New York, 1939, 388.
12 Ibid., 406

12

long as the blood remains preserved in purity.

Alone the loss

.,

of purity of the blood destroys the inner happiness forever; it
eternally lowers man and never again can its consequences be
removed from body and mind. 1t1 3

The reason he gives for exalt-

ing racial purity above all else is that Providence has willed
it so and Nature has proven it over and over. 14

According to

Hitler this exaltation of race is true to such an3extent that
the distance between the lowest forms that are still called
human and our highest races is greater than that existing between the lowest type of human beings and the ape. 1 5
The education of the German people, especially the youth,
must necessarily center attention on racial purity and Aryan
superiority.

Hitler

writes~

The folkish State's entire work i
of education and training has some
day to find its culmination in
branding, through instinct and reason, the race sense and race feeling
into the hearts and brains of the
youth with whom it is entrusted.
No boy or girl must leave school
without having been led to the ultimate knowledge of the necessity
and the natgre of the purity of
the blood.
The education of the boys must be directed primarily to their
physical well-being, since it is the physical part that propagates other "pure blooded" members of the Aryan society; the

13
14
15

16

Ibid., 452
Loc. cit.

Race:~tion:

Person, vii, (1)

Hitler, 636, 637

~_~__------------------------------------------------~13
f·

promotion of spiritual and intellectual values is a secondary
consideration.

.,

Analagous with the education of the boys, the

folkish State must direct the education of the girls; .the goal
of female education must always be the future mother. 17

In

practice Nazism is consistent; its action comes straight from
the heart of its principles.
A more subtle form of racism than Nazism is the theory of
white supremacy.

It began in Europe but became most widely

diffused in the United states, where many of its proponents
still cling to its main principles.
de Gobineau wrote his Essai

In 1853, Joseph Arthur

~.l'inegalite

des races humaines,

a simp'le proof that the Negro was a member of an inferior race
and therefore necessarily fit for slavery.

Houston Stewart

Chamberlain took hold of Gobineau's theory; later it traversed
the Atlantic and became the central theme of J. H. Van Evrie,
Madison Grant, Lothrop Stoddard, Major.Shufeldt, Carlyle McKinley, Gustavus M. Pinckney, Gene Talmadge, Senator Bilbo;
and the members of the Ku Klux Klan, the National Association
for the Preservation of the White Race, the White American Society, and the Commoner Party, all of which are in the United
States and supported by Americans.
According to white-supremists the Caucasian race represents the highest type of the human family, the Negro race the
lowest.

Their solution of the race question is as simplified

as that of the National Socialists.
17

Ibid.!.., 621

In 1868, Dr. J. H. Van

__--------------------------------------------------~4
Evrie published his White Supremacy and Negro Subordination,

.,

or "Negroes, a Subordinate
Normal Condition.tI

Race, and (So-called) Slavery, Its

The theme of the author is introduced with

the words of Dr. Cartwright, " ••• in regard to Negro slavery •••
it is no slavery, but a natural relation of 'the races •••• ,,18
A review of Dr. Van Evrie's sub-chapter headings will give a
clear picture of the white-supremacy theory: "European Misconception of the Negro," "False Issue of a Single Human Race,tI
"The Races Specifically Different from Eaeh Other," "The Inferior Races are Incapable of Acquiring and Transmitting Knowledge," "The Black Complexion a Sign of Inferiority," The Folly
and Impiety of Attempting to Equalize Those Whom God has made
unequal, et6.,,19

Nazi racists said that the distance between

the lowest forms that are still called human and our highest
races is greater than that existing between the lowest type of
human beings and the ape.

Dr. Van Evrie has written:

And the entire bodily structure'of
the negro, down to the minutest
atom of elementary matter, differs
just as widely, of course, as the
color of the skin or other external
qualities from those of the white
man. It is equally palpable to the
reason that the nature of the negro,
his instincts, all the faculties of
his mind, and all the functions of
his body, are pervaded by the same
or by relative differences from
those of the Caucasian ••••
18 Dr. J. H. Van Evrie. -White Supremacy and ~ Subordination. Van Evrie, Horton and Co., New York, 18~viii.
~Ibid., ix-xvi

~____----------------------------_1~5
Such, then, is the negro -- I
the lowest in the scale as the
Caucasian is the most elevated in
the human creation -- a creature
not degraded -- for none of God's
creatures are degraded -- but that
is widely different and vastly subordinate to the elaborately organ- 0
ized and highly endowed white man. 2
j

It would be a mistake to suppose that Van Evrie was alone
in his defense of white-wupremacy.

The English essayist, David

Hume, once wrote, "I am apt to suspect the negroes ••• to be
naturally inferior to the Whites ••• Such a uniform and constant
difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if
nature had not made an original distinction betwixt these
21
breeds of men. tf
Professor Smith of Tulane University: "Now,
if nature and the tide of time have spent such centuraes of
centuries in chiseling out this chasm, how infinitely preposterous to suppose that man can close it up in a generation
with the filmy webs of common culture and social equality and
civil rights •••• ,,22

Mr. James A. Froude:

tIThe equality be-

tween black and white is a forced equality and not a real one,
and Nature in the long run has her way, and readjusts in their
proper relations what theorists and philanthropists have disturbed.,,23

Carlyle McKinley:

"The two races in America will

20 Ibid., 134-135, 141
21 David Hume. Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, trOf
National Characters. Longmans, Green, and Co., London, 1875,
Vol. I, 252, note 1.
22 William B. Smith. The Color Line. McLure, Philips, and Company, New York, 1905, 248
---23 James A. Froude, The English in the West Indies or The Bow
of Ulysses. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, l888,~4r-- ---

~____--------------------------------------------------_1~6
remain apart, in obedience to a law that is so nearly if not

.,

wholly universal in its operation that we are compelled to

re~

gard it as a fundamental law of human, nature, and, therefore,
beyond hope of repeal or evasion." 24
The

White-supremist~'

answer to the race question rests

on the philosophical supposition that the white race is superior naturally to the colored races.

For these racists the two

central motives of action are: 1) The colored races must be
kept in their subordinate position as servants of the white
race;

~)

The purity of the white' race must be zealously pre-

served.
Besides the white-supremists in the United States there
has grown up another system'of philosophical thought with totalitarian inclinations.

In opposition to the anti-totalitar-

ian principles enunciated in the

Declaration of Independence

these philosophers would insist that actually the Declaration
is an outmoded,9.ocument no longer in agreement with modern
thought. They would change one clause of the Declaration to
read, "that all men are made equal under the State, that they
are endowed by the State with certain State-given rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness. tI
This major premise of totalitarian philosophy is still in the
class-room stages in the United States.

An example of this

24 Carlyle McKinley. An Appeal to Pharaoh. The State Company
Columbia: S.C., 1907, 91." (Vd. "Organization Plan of The Common
er Party of the United States of America," Commoner Party National Headquarters, Cpn,yers, Georgia, 1946.)

~ ____----------------------__________________1~7
school of thought is found in Harold Faulkner I s history textbook:

Viewed from the high, point of I
twentieth century historical and
ethnological research, the Declaration is not wholly convincing.
Only in a limited sense, if at all,
have men ever been created equal,
nor are they endowed with any
rights, except those they can
obtain and hold, nor were governments, in spite of certain American precedents, originated to secure these 'inalienable rights. I If 25

Here is totalitarian philosophy at least in germ; the future
of its program will depend on its acceptance or rejection outside the class room.
Other thinkers whose doctrines affect the ,problem of
Negro-White relationships in the United States may be listed
as the irrationalists and the social philosophers.

The first

group consists of the anti-spiritual scientists and the aspiritual psychologists.
Some scientists today deny the reality of a spiritual
order, and therefore of an intellectual order in man.

Some of

these are logical enough to keep out of the realm of philosophy altogether; others try to make the deduction that matter
alone is capable of existing because nothing outside of matter

25 Harold U. Faulkner. American Political and Social History.
Croft and Company, New York, 1941, 2nd edition, 97.

18
can be experienced by men. 26

The findings of an absolutely

.,

materialistic science were systematized into .the form of a
theory propounded by Charles Darwin, the theory of evolution
of organic species through natural selection. 27

In the name

of this same science a more modern materialist (and more avid
anti-intellectualist and anti-spiritualist), John Dewey, put
the final touches to the philosophy of irrationalism; he attacked every traditional belief by seeking a freedom against
reason; he gave man only one life, that of servitude to physical nature. 28

Thus, for the materialistic scientists race

is only one way of claasifying different animal types.
answer to

·~·the

Their

race question is founded on men I s identity in

common animality.
26

To explain

,
W¥f
natural scientists have readily
ph osophy is not a difficult task.

taken to a
In the past
century enormous progress has been made in the investigation
and interpretation of material nature, and the investigators
and interpreters have been convinced tht.t this must be all
that exi.gts. The biologists, for example, have labored over
that part of man .in which he is not essentially different from
the other animals. Prog~ess in medicine has been made by experiments with brute animals and then later applied to men.
It is thus explainable why scientists have concluded that if
the blood circulation and digestive processes of men are not
essentially different from those of·the other animals then
man is·not different from other animals in his nature. They
become anti-spiritual, because they formulate the principle
that the real is coextensive with the sensible.
27 Charles Darwin. The Origin of Species ~ Means of Natural Selection. D. Appleton and 0"0., New York, 1907
~is significant to note that Karl Marx regarded Darwin's
theory as "the greatest scientific discovery of all time: the
key to all human progress and history." Vd. Race: Nation:
Person, 135.
-- ---28 Race: Nation: Person, 87
mate~ialistic

~_"

__----------------------------n-~--~l~
..
In line with this irrationalist philosophy has arisen a

school of psychology that has taken the monistic philosophy of

Hegel and Spinoza 29 and developed a philosophy of tfuniversal
parallelism. tt

G.T. Fechner, the father of

experimen~al

psy-

chology proposed the theory of "psYChophsical, parallelism, It
which assumes a strict co-ordination of bodily and mental
phenomena so ,that to each phenomenon of the "bodilytl series
there corresponds one of the "mental "~r,series, both of which
are due to a kind of "pre-established harmony. ,,30

Fechner's

theory was adopted by Fried:t"ich Paulsen and later applied to
animals, plants, and minerals, so that the whole world became "one vast animal animated by a single world-soul.,,3l
The relations of men in this world-soul depend on their physical or psychical a-spiritual participation in that soul,
which alone gives meaning to men's existerice.
Various social philosophers have espoused a novel theory
that has a direct bearing on the problem of race relations.
This ttSocial Contract" theory began is Jean Jacques Rousseau's declaration of the sovereignty of the people or of
29 Spinoza made the pantheistic (or monistic) idea of God or
Nature the fundamental thesis of his system. Hegel went a
step further by identifying reality with ideality. According
to Dr. O'Toole, "This absolute Idea proceeds in eternal selfmovement from itself to become Nature and then, reverting to
itself, becomes self-conscious Spirit in Humanity •••• The individual mind, the 'subjective spirit', is a lower manifestation of the Absolute than the forms of the 'objective spirit'
among which the state is the highest." Ibid., 297.
30 Ibid., 299.
---31 Ibid., 232-242.
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society

Absolutism,3 2 which has subsequently become~ the key-

stone of a social philosophy that places every solution of a
social problem in the capitalization of Society or Humanity.
Rousseau explained his theory thus:
If the State or City is nothing
but a moral person, the life of
which consists in the union of
its members, and if the most important of its cares is that of
self-preservation, it needs a
universal and compulsive force
to move and dispose every part
in the manner most expedient for
the whole. As nature gives every
man an absolute power over all his
limbs, the soc ial pac t gives the
body politic an absolute power
over all its members; and it is
this same power which, when directed by the general will, bears,
as I ~aid, the name of sovereignity.35
Rousseau made the only truly living reality, existing in itself and for itself, Society, the

tl

one substance" to which

individuals are subordinated, and in which human personalities
are submerged.

For August Comte society became lithe most

vital of known beings"; for M. Fouillee, a great "physiological individual tl ; For E. Durkheim society was all, as he
wrote "Man is a man only because he lives in society •••• It is
32 "By absolutism is meant any theory of supreme, unlimited,
irresponsible power vested in the government of a State, such
that all individual liberties are extinguished by the constitution of an omnipotent civil authority to whose will and
sovereignity there is no limit.fI Ibid., 243
33 Jean Jacques Rousseau. Social-contract, II, 4 in Ideal
Empires and Republics. William H. Wise Co., New York, 1901,

25.
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society that forms the human type.,,3 4

According to these so-

.,

clal philosophies the racial characteristics of men are lost
;

in society in the same way as they are in the Communistic and
Fascistic communities; here Society replaces Class and State
as an absolute.

Here the r ace question is answered by an un-

derstanding of men's common identity as members of Society.
A second group of

soci~l

philosophers has been intensely

interested in social problems and has presented their solutions in a manual, The City of Man,
Democracy.35

~

Declaration on World

This group is especially concerned with the

problem of race relations; they claim that the "Negro himself,
with whom our failure was most inglorious, helps us by reminding us that our slow progress is a mere token of the justice we pledge -- until all races rise to equal i ty in matur";' '.
ity.,,36

The purpose of the group, therefore, is to show how

all races will rise to "equality in maturity," and why "the
emergency of democracy must be the emergence of democracy.,,37
In order to make way for a true understanding of the
equality of all races of men in the United States,
a new foundation, then, must be
34 Race: Nation: Person, 226.
35 The City of Man, A Declaration £Q World Democracy. The
Viking Press, New york, 1941. This book was the result of the
combined efforts of Herbert Agar, Frank Aydelotte, G. A. Borgese, Hermann Broch, Van Wyck Brooks, Ada L. Comstock, William
Yandell ,Elliott, Dorothy Canfield Fisher, Christian Gauss,
Oscar Jaszi, Alvin Johnson, Hans Kohn, Thomas Mann, Lewis Mumford, William Allen Neilson, Reinhold Niebuhr, Gaetano Sa1ve36 Ib ., 69
mini.
37
., 67
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laid for a new democracy -- in
the firm rock of conviction, deep
below the moving sand of opinion.
And the concept of a vital democracy must be dissociated from the
notion of a disintegrated liberalism, which is a precu§sor of tyrannyand a prey to it. 3
Democracy, therefore, must be redefined.

tlDemocracy is noth-

ing more and nothing less than humanism in theocracy and
rational theocracy in universal humanism. tl39

Contrary to the

Fascistic teaching that everything must be within the State,
"Democracy teaches that everything must be within humanity,
nothing against humanity, nothing outside humanity. ,,40

The

"Social Contract theory" has been revised to fit "modern"
needs.

These social philosophers want their humanitarian

autocracy to oppose totalitarian
same time becoming totalitarian.

a~tocracy

without at the

Thus, everything must be

measured according. to the standard set by Democracy, "since
democracy alone combines the fundamental characteristics of
law, equality, and justice.,,4l

"In broad terms the task here

is to determine what religious and ethical traditions are of
greater

o~

lesser value for the preservation and growth of

the democratic principle. tf42
How all races will rise to tlequality in maturity" is les.s
evident than the fundamental principles which determine this

------------
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plan for equality.

..

First, Americans must realize the prima

principia of democracy: "Everything within humanity, nothing
against humanity, nothing outside humanity.

If

.Secondly, they

must adopt the universal religion of the Spirit, to which all
men are witnesses:
This is -- in an interpretation
suited to the modern mind -- the
spirit whic~ Christ called the
Holy Ghost. 3
This common creed already
exists; toward its luminous center all higher minds already
point, from whatever distant horizon they may set out. The yoke of
the creed is as easy as it is inevitable •••• It teaches that a divine intention governs the universe
-- be it called God or Deity or the
Holy Ghost or the Absolute or Logos
or even Evolution •••• It teaches
that in the universe we know the
human species is the !Eearhead of
the divine intention.
Thirdly, all people must participate in government to assure
the rule of the strongest and wisest, who will be themselves
the champions of humanity.

Lastly, the State must always re-

main the hand-maid of humanity, the servant of the common
good, because the unity of the people is the permanent source
of power behind those who temporarily -hold it.45
Why the emergence of Democracy must renew the face of
the earth comes from the very meaning of Democracy and its
"intrinsic opposition" to totalitarianism.
43

44
4

Ibid., 35
Ibid., 47
Ibid. 29

"It is univer-
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sality we oppose to totalitariani.sm, republican unity to au-

.,

tarchic despotism, service in brotherhood to regimentation in
serfdom.,,46

The world has been thrown into the chasm of Tyr-

anny; a new world must arise as the City of Man, which will
be the source of man, his dignity, his rights.

Here then we

have Human Absolutism replacing State and Class and Race Absolutism, humanity redeemed by Humanity.
The third group of social philosophers is typified by Dr.
Gunnar Myrdal, professor in the University of Stockholm and
member of the Swedish Senate, who was invited by the Carnegie
Corporation of New York in 1937 to come to the United States
and make a comprehensive study of the Negro-White problem.
Dr. Myrdal accepted.

In 1944 the complete expose of his

findings was published in a two volume work, An American Dilemma.

Here we have the most generally accepted authoritative

study of the race question.

But we are primarily interested

in Dr. Myrdal's survey in the light of its philosophical content, that is, in so far as it offers the ultimate answer to
the question.
In his introduction Dr. Myrdal gives the philosophical
basis for 'discussing his social data; thus, the first 'part of
the introduction bears the title, liThe Negro Problem as a
~/I'oral

Issue.

It

But before anyone can disagree with a sociol-

ogist's trespassing into the field of philosophy, Dr. Myrdal
hastens to state:
46

Ibid., 25

In approaching the Negro problem
as primarily a moral issue of con~
flicting valuations, it is not implied, of course, that ours is the
prerogative of pronouncing on ~ priori grounds which values are Ifright"
and which are "wrong." In fact, such
judgments are out of the realm of
social science, and will not be attempted in this inquiry. Our investigation will naturally be an analysis of morals and not in morals.
In so far as we make our own judgments of value, they will be based
on ex-rlicitly stated value premises,
selected rrom among those valuations
actually observed as existing in the
minds of the white and Negro Americans
and tested as to their social and political relevance and significance. Our
value judgments are thus derived and
have not greater validity 4ban the
value premises postulated. 7
This is an important statement; it admits objectivity in recording subjective "valuations actually observed as existing
in the minds of the white and Negro Americans."

It gives Dr.

Myrdal freedom to express boldly the problem as he sees it,
without having to posit unsociologically any fundamental
"first principles."

Thus, when Dr. Myrdal speaks of a "moral

issue,1f of "fundamental beliefs," ideals of essential dignity," etc., he does not mean to imply that he even knows
that such things really and objectively exist as such, but
that he is merely indicating what·Americans, taken in globo,
generally refer to as their "American heritage."

47

Dr. Gunnar Myrdal. An American Dilemma.
thers, New York, 1944, xlvi-xlvii.

Dr. Uyrdal

Harper and Bro-

~iS

writing for all Americans; he wishes to combine all their

?

.,

-

various philosophies into a harmonious, universal creed, somewhat like the one presented by the City of Man humanists.
Dr. Myrdal explains what he means by "The Negro Problem
as a Moral

Issue~:

'Though our study includes economic,
social, and political race relations, at bottom our problem is the
moral dilemma of the American -- the
conflict between his moral valuations on various levels of consciousness and generality. The "American
.Dilemma ll referred to in the title of
this book is the ever-raging conflict
between, on the one hand, the valuations preserved on the general plane
which we shall call the tfAmerican
Creed," where the American thinks,
talks, and acts under the influence
of high national and Christian precepts, and, on the other hand, the
valuations on specific planes of
individual and group living, where
personal and local interests; economic, social and sexual jealousies;
considerations of community prestige and conformity; group prejudice against particular persons or
types of people; and all sorts of
miscellaneous wants, impulse~~ and
habits dominate his outlook. 0
He further states that the moral struggle goes on within
people, and that their behaviour normally becomes a moral
compromise when their valuations are in conflict.

The strug-

gle is between the American's devotion to the American Creed
and his natural feelings: reason against emotion; spirit
48

Ibid., xliii.

~~--------------~
against flesh.

And the average American, has, concerning this

.,

problem of the races, compormised the Creed.
the psychological aspect of the answer.

This, then, is

What will be the more

basic, the ontological answer?
The ultimate norm of morality, as Dr.

~"'yrdal

sees it re-

flected in American thought, is adherence to the American
creed, which, accordingly, must be ultimum atque summum.

In

defining the Creed he says:
I

These ideals of the essential dignity
of the individual human being, of the
fundamental equality of all men, and of
certain inalienable rights to freedom,
justice, and a fair opportunity represent to the American people the essential meaning of the nation's early
struggle for independence. In the
clarity and intellectual boldness of
the Enlightenment period these tenets
were written into the Declaration of
Independence, the Preamble of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights and into
the constitutions of the several states.
The ideals of the American Creed have
thus ~~come the highest law of the
land. ':J
The ttideological roots of the American Creed" are explained
as 1) European philosophy of Enlightenment, i.e. the French
eighteenth century humanitarianism and equalitarianism, represented by Rousseau, and the English seventeenth century
liberalism, represented by John Locke; 2) Christianity, especially Protestant Christianity as seen in the lower class
sects; 3) English law with its democratic concepts of law and

---------------
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order and its philosophical ideas of human
alienable rights.

equality~nd

JA44

in-

Dr. Myrdal summarizes his discussion by

saying that
for practical purposes the main
norms of the American Creed as
usually pronounced are centered
in the belief in equality and in
the rights of liberty •••• a humanistic liberalism developing out of
the epoch of Enlightenment when
America received its national consciousness and its political structure. The Revolution did not stop
short of anything less than the
heroic desire for the "emancipation of human nature. tt50
The United states cannot claim this creed as her own monopoly;
rather must it be considered "the common democratic creed as
it matured in. our common

Western civilization. tl 51

The answer to the question of Negro-White relationships
will depend upon the American's ability to follow his belief
in the American Creed, "which is firmly rooted in Americans'

hearts.,,5~

Dr. Myrdal asserts that there is reason to be-

lieve that most Americans will succeed in overcoming this
"moral dilemma," because tithe trend of psychology, education,
anthropology, and social science is toward environmentalism in
the explanation of group differences, which means that the
racial beliefs which defended caste are being torn away ••••
Authority and respectibility are no longer supporting the
50
51
52
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popular beliefs. "53

Furthermore,

it is significant today even the
white man who defends discrimination frequently describes his
motive as "prejudice" and says
that it is It irrational." The.
popular beliefs rationalizing
caste in America are no longer
intellectually respectable ••••
There is today a queer feeling
of creao quia absurdum hovering
over the whole complex of popular beliefs sustaining racial
discrimination. This makes the
prejudiced white man nearly as
pathetic as his Negro victim. 54.
According to Dr. Myrdal it is the singular task of democracy
lito determine what religious and ethical traditions are of
greater or lesser value for the preservation a.nd growth of
the democratic principle."55

Here humanity is redeemed by

Democracy.
All the "other answers" to the race question have been
outlined as objectively as possible.
Scholastic answer.

We will now present the

In a later chapter we will judge the

value of the "other answers" in the light of true philosonhical principles.

,.
r. . ·_--------------~
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CHAPTER II
PRELUDE TO THE SCHOLASTIC ANSWER

In beginning the Scholastic answer to the question of
Negro-White relationships we must insist on the primacy of
philosophy in the sphere of human knowledge.

Every human

question must be first of all a philosophical question; the
social question of race relations is no exception.

All action

directed to the solution of social problems proceeds from the
philosophical principles that determine the purpose and mode
of that action.

These

prin~iples,

then, are the sources from

which comes progression in every human endeavor, whether it
be purely speculative or practical.
Scholastic philosophy begins with ontology, the science
of being, or "first philosophy,

tt

as Aristotle calls it.

This.

science is "first 11 because it abstracts from t he material and
even from the quantitative aspect of being and penetrates to
the tlbeingness" of all things.

Although the immediate object

of knowledge is the essence existing in the material, mutable
thing of everyday contact, the mature mind clarifies t he immediate object by accentuating its existential element and
thereby arriving at the underlying reality that gives the
thing its being.

From this science of ontology comes order
30

in both speculative and practical knowledge.

.,

Jacques Maritain

says that ontology reveals to man "the hierarchy of authentic
values through all the extent of being.
hiS ethics.

It gives a center to

It maintains justice in the universe of knowledge,

making clear the natural limits, the harmony and subordination
of various sciences ...... l

Just as social action will depend

on the philosophical principles that direct it, so philosophy
will depend on its ontology; from this basic science will rise
up the super-structure of philosophy; through it all knowledge
is given the objectivity that makes it to be true.
Since our problem here is one dealing with the human
actions of men, it is an ethical problem.

Ethics or moral

philosophY is that science concerned with the rightness of
human actions as known from their ultimate causes and through
the light of natural reason.

Therefore, after establishing a

firm foundation in ontology we must set up an ultimate principle in ethics, which will at once proceed from the objective
reality of being and lead to a true as well as efficient sociology.

The Scholastic answer begins with the ontological or

metaphys ical foundation
then

wes~nts

-- the dignity «tfr the human person

the moral or ethical principle -- the doctrine

of human rights.

Taken together the basic foundation and the

ultimate principle form the complete Scholastic answer.
1 Jacques Maritain. The Degrees of Knowledge.
ner's Sons, New York, 1938, 5.

Charles Scrib-

r-·------------------~
.,

We offer the. Scholastic answer, not because it has been
mainly the answer of St. Thomas Aquinas,2 nor because any human or even divine authority has suggested this answer, but
simply and practically because it ist he only true and ultimate answer.

Our dependence on the philosophy of

in noway vitiates the reasonableness of our

St~

Thomas

~rguments.

We

follow him not because he is St. Thomas Aquinas but because he
is a "herald of Truth.1f

It would be the height of inconsis-

tency for us to appeal to his authority as a basis for the
acceptability of our arguments., for he above all distrusted
human authority as worthy of argumentative use. 3
human authority but he was devoted to Truth.

He respected

It is this de-

votion we wish to imitate and exemplify here -- in the Scholastic answer.
Finally, we must postulate in our presentation the necessary existence of

~personal

and provident God, who is the

First Cause and the Final End of all that has being.

These

facts rieed philosophical proof and it can be found in the
2 Our answer is called Scholastic in reference to the spirit
of medieval philosophy that was integrated into a systematic
whole by St. Thomas Aquinas. Through the metonymous use of
Scholasticism as the title of St. Thomas t philo·sophy he now
stands as the Scholastic. The Scholastic answer, then, will
be St. Thomas' answer, although there have been other Scholastics, in the less strict sense of the term, who have disagreed with St. Thomas' philosophical conclusions.
3 St. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica,I, 1,8 ad 2. Domus
Editorialis Marietti, editio XXII, 1939: "Nam li~et locus ab
auctoritate quae fundatur super ratione humana, sit infirmissimus •••• 11

Here we must presuppose the validity
and cogency of that proof. 4
writings of st. Thomas.

4

~.,

I, 2; 8; 12; 22; 44; 45; 46; 103;104; 105.
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r' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . . ,
7

CHAPTER III
THE SCHOLASTIC ANSWER: METAPHYSICAL
Since we are beginning

Ii!.

study that concerns the inter-

relations of men in society, we must have a complete and integral idea about men.

To have this we must strip them of all

material and quantitative values; we· must study the essential
meaning not of men, but of ~.l Once we have understood man,
then we will be able to study men.

Jacques

l\~aritain

writes

that this idea of man is "not entirely \rerifiable in senseexperience, though it possesses criteria and proofs of its
---------~-------

I The metaphysical concept·of man that we are considering
here must not be identified with Plato's or Aristotle's doctrines. Etienne Gilson has fully expressed the Platonic and
Aristotelian;;.approaches: "In a doctrine like Plato's it is
not at all this Socrates, however highly extolled he may be,
that matters; it is Man. If Socrates has anY'importance at all
it is only because he is an exceptionally happy, but at the
same time quite accidental, participation in the being of an
Idea. The idea of Man is eternal, immutable, necessary; Socrates, like all other individuals, is only a temporarw and accidental being; he partakes of the unreality of his matter,
in which the permanence of the idea is reflected and his merely momentary being flows away on the stream of·becoming •••• In
the system of Aristotle the unreality and accidental character
of the individual physical being as compared with the necessity of the pUre acts and·the E?ternlty of species are no less
evident. Aristotle's world is certainly a very different one
from Plato's, since the Ideas, far from constituting the typical reality are now refused all proper subsistence. In Aristotle's philosophy t~e universal is far from nothing, but it
never enjoys the privilege of subsistence, only particulars
can properly be said to exist; and it is therefore only just
to say that the reality of the individual is much more strongly marked in his doctrine than it is in Plato's. Nevertheles~,
in both, the universal 1s the important thing." The Spirit of
Mediaeval Philosophy. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1940,
190-191.
34

r----~----~----------~--------------~--~-,.
own, and it deals with the essential and intrinsic, though not
~

visible or tangible characters, and with the intelligible
sity of that being which we call man."2
want to know about him are: Who is he?
is he?

Why is he?

den~

The things we will
What is He?

Whence

A reply to each of these questions will

form the basic foundation for a true understanding of our
problem.
To discover who man is, we must first know the full meaning of being and then of man's participation in being.

What-

ever we grasp mentally, we grasp as being; every concept that
we use in order to arrive at knowledge of reality presupposes
the concept of being.

As to content, it is found in every-

thing; it transcends all ge~era and species, which consequent~
ly represent certain particularizations of being.

Yet in

order to understand fully the idea of abstract being, we must
analyze the concrete reality from which the idea of being
arises.

This concrete reality proclaims its being to our

senses in the existence of individual things.

All nature and

all the processes of nature are designed fori-the production
and sustenance of individual things, which thus become the
,

material object of the natural sciences, as well as the Bubject of a scientific research which seeks to penetrate to the
2 Jacques Maritain. Education at the CroBsroads.
vers i ty Press, New Haven, 1943, .5."

Yale Unl-

rr
)

principles of being. 3

To get at the nature of being as visibl
41

in individual things philosophers have proffered many different doctrines.

The Pythagoreans thought that numbers were
the only true being. 4 For Empedocles the natural elements of

fire, air, earth, and water were the irreducibles. 5 Plato
turned to his universe of Ideas. 6 Aristotle, rooted as he was
in empiric reality, taught that the individual was true being,
and that every individual thing subject to change was composed
of two parts~ matter and form. 7 For" him the matter is the basis for the reception of the form, through which the matter
has existence.
sion:

Father Meyer summarizes Aristotle's conclu-

"I call matter substance in the sense that it is pos-

sible; I call the form substance in the sense that it is real,
and the individual thing I call substance in the sense that
is composed of matter and form. 1t8 In st. Thomas' writings we
find the same declaration that the individual thing is true
reality, and thet erm, substance, belongs primarily to the
individual,9 which he defines as "in itself undivided, but
3 Hans Meyer. The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated
by Rev. Frederic Eckhoff. B. Herder Book Company, st. Louis,
1944, 58.
4 William Turner. History of Philosophy. Ginn and Company,
New York, 1903, 40.
.
5 Ibid., 58-59
6 Ibid., 100-105.
7 IbId., 137-139.
8 Meyer. OPe cit., 98 (MetaPhYsics VIII, 1, 3; VII, 4, 17.)
9 Summa, 1, 29, 2 ad 4, 5.

~
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distinct from others."lO

Thus the individual is called first

.,

substance, in contrast to second substances which,havecexistence only in some respect or , because of a relation to the
first substance. ll The first substance is independent of
other beings for its subsistence; thus it may be

call~

sub-

ject, suppositum, hypostasis, or merely subsistence. 12
To determine how individuals differ from one another we
differences~

must distinguish their

Each being of which we

have direct knowledge in the present life has certain evident
traits which it shares with other individuals that

cbp~ely

resemble it; at the same time each being has other marks proper to itself alone.,

The common notes, called "specific char-

acters"are manifested in ali the members of a species; the
proper notes o.r "individual differences,
alone..

tf

in the individuals

To' find the ultimate reason for these individual dif-

ferences St.

Thoma~

recalled Aristotlets division of substance

into matter and, form. 13

He knew that the form, the basis of

the substantial essence, could not be the basis of individuality because the form in itself is universal and can be receive
10 Ibid., 1, 29,4: It • • • quod est in se indistinctum, ab aliis
vero distinctum. tt English translations of ' the Summa are (unles
otherwise noted) taken from Basic Writings of St. ~homas tguinas, edited by Anton C. Pegis. Random House, New York, 19 5.
11 St. Thomas Aquinas.
In VII Metaphysica, 1, 2. ~
12 Summa, 1, 29, 2.
13 By definition, form 1s that by which a being has existence;
it is an active principle that confers on a thing a cert~in
kind of being with specific properties. Matter, on the other
hand, is the substratum from which, as from a co-principle,
every being takes its origin; it is passive, indefinite, undetermined. The individual thing is a substance composed of
matter and form.

that of its form, which is the source of substantiality, then

.,

the individual owes more to the form than to matter.
All that has been said about being and individual can now
be applied to the subject of our discussion -- man.

Man is

an individual, but not in the same sense that a tulip or a
kangaroo is an individual.

He is something more; he is a per-

son, which is defined by St. Thomas (in accordance with Boethius' famous definition) as "an individual substance endowed
wi th reason. tl19

After approving this definition of person, St •
..

Thomas immediately puts to use Aristotle's principles·of matter
and form: Man is composed not of matter alone nor of form
alone, but of matter actualized by a form.

Body (matter) and

soul (form) belong to the nature of man; this body and this
soul b~long to the nature of this man. 20 Lest his definition
of person seem to raise man to a level higher than his nature
warrants, st.

T~omas

notes that, although person in general

signifies the individual substance of a rational nature, person in any.nature signifies what is distinct in that nature;
\

thus in human nature it signifies body and soul, which do not
belong to person in general but to the !meaningof a human
person. 21

Now by comparing man with all other earthly beings,

we see ,that he alone fulfills the definition of a person, he
alone is endowed with reason.

And since it is the form -- the

Summa, I, 29, 1 ad 1: "Persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia. fI
20 Ib id., I , 29 ,2 ad 3.
21 Ibid., l,29, 4.

19

.,

soul -- that bestows being on matter -- the body --, we may
rightly say that man is a person because of his soul; his
rationality is the root principle of his personality.22

Sinc9C:':

his rationality lies at the basis of the subsistence of his
soul and, therefore, of himself, we may further say that the
principle of

h~s

individuality and the principle of his person

ality come back in the end to the aame thing.

As Etienne Gil-

son puts it, "The actuality of the reasonable soul, in communicating itself to the body, determines the existence of a.n
individual who is a person, so that the individual soul possesses personality as by definition.tta~

As it is the form

that enables the indivtdual to subsist, so is it the rational
soul that enables man to exist as a human person.

It is the

soul of man that gives him dignity.
Tracing back the origin of the word, tlperson," St. Thomas
agrees with Boethius that the word originally referred to the
masks.

I

(i1'fo~(j)~

worn by actors in comedies and tragedies;

then he adds:
For as famous men were represented
in comedies and tragedies, the name
person. was given to signify those
who held high dignity. Hence, those
who held high rank in the Church
came to be called persons. Hence,
some definite person as a. hypostasis distinct Bl reason of dignity.
22 Again we must emphasize and maintain strictly the nonindividuality of the soul as ,soul, since two forms of this
kind which would be numerically distinct as forms, would seem
incapable of mutual existence.
23 Q.E. cit., 202.

~
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~

And because subsistence in a rational
nature is of high dignity, ,therefore
every individual of a rational nature
is called a person. 24

r~

The intrinsic relation of t'dignityff and "human person" clearly
manifests itself.

According to its definition, "dignity"

means "the state, character, or quality of being worthy or
honorable; elevation of character; intrinsic worth; nobleness;
excellence."

Dignity is a recognition of someone's worthiness,

of inner qualities that demand to be honored.

Human dignity

is intrinsic to man; it comes from his nature
nature, as St. Thomas understood and defined it.

his personal
This same

dignity will be known through the operations characteristic
of a rational be ing,. that is, through thought and the exerc ise
of free will.
The, way has been prepared for the second question, ttWhat
is man? tf

The acts of intell ectual cognition ahd will-power

that are natural to man must find their proportionate cause in
some concrete principle, real, and consequently subsisting in
a determinate nature.

When there are acts of thought and of

will there are thinking and wi.11ing substances, call them
Summa, 1,29, 3 ad 2: "Quia enim in comoediis et tragoedli
aliqui homines famosi, impositum est hoc
nomen, persona, ad signifieandum aliquoa dignitatem habentes.
Unde consueverunt dici personae in Ecclesiis, quae habent ali-,
quam dignitatem. Propter quod quidamdefinlunt personam, dicentes quod 'persona est hypostasis proprietate distincta ad
dlgnitatem pertinente.' Et quia magnae dignitatis est in rationali natura subsistere, ideo omne individuum rationalis
naturae dieitur persona, ut dietum est. tt
24

~epraesentabantur

·rr·
"

,h

whatever we wiSh.

According to Thomist terminology they are
~

intellect {intellectus) and will (voluntas), which are the
~

from which the actio of man's rationality flows; conse-

quently, the nature of the rational faculties will determine
the nature of the rational operations.

Yet it will be

easier~

for us to study first the operations, in order to get at' the
full meaning of the faculties,

themselv~s,

which, according to

St. Thomas, are the only two faculties of the soul,25 which is
in truth the informing principle of the human person.
The important fact a bout the intellect is its spirituality, in defense of which St. Thomas offers three proofs;
1) it can know incorporeal things; 2) it has the power of reflection; 3) its proper object is the universal idea.

We will

summarize these three proofs.
First, the knowledge that men acquire through the exter\

nal and internal senses always 'has to do with the singular
and concrete, as

e~perience

itself shows.

'This fact is the

result of the inherent dependence of the sen.ses on physical
organs for their proper functions; the sense of sight, for
example, by means of its delicate organ, the eye, is adapted
to receive and retain the external forms of individual colored
objects.

The intellect has an entirely different nature; it

begins where the senses end their work.

The,fundamental pro-

cess of the intellect is to abstract from the individuating
25

Summa, I, 16, 1.

.,

The second power of the intellect is that of reflection,
which is an action outside the realm of a purely material substance.

Reflection, which is a turning or folding back upon

oneself, is impossible for a material being, because the same
part of a being having parts outside of parts cannot touch the
very same part.
feat; it

~an

as a whole.

The intellect, however, can accomplish this

reflect upon itself, not.only part by part, but
st. Thomas writes:
No body's action reflects on the
agent: for it is proved ••• that no
body is moved by itself except in
respect of a part, so that, namely,
one of its parts be mover and the
other moved. Now the intellect by
its action reflects on itself, for
it understands .itself not only as
a part, but as a whole. 27

i~

In another place he says that tlit is impossible for any power
emp~oying

a bodily organ to reflect on its own act, since the

instrument whereby it would know itself would fall midway between the power knowing and the instrument by which it knew
in the first place. tl28
Finally, the spirituality of t he intellect is inferred
27 Loc. cit.; "Nullius corporis actio reflectitur super agentem; oetensum est enim ••• quod nullum corpus a seipso movetur
nisi ,secundum partem, ita scilicet quod una pars ejus sit movens, alia mota. Intellectus autem supra seipsum, non solum ~e
cundum partem, sed secundum totum."
28 St. Thomas Aquinas. In L1brum III Sententiarum, Dist. 23,
Q. I, a. 2: 'tHoc autem nOnpotest esse ita quod al1t!4Ua potenti
u1=-ens organo corporali-reflectatur super proprium actum, quia
oportet quod 1nstrumentum quo cognosci se, eaderet medium int
ipsam potent~am et instrumentumquo primo cognoscebat. tf

from the universality and
ssesses.

neoess1ty~6f

the idea which it po-

.,

The speoies or ideas of things understood become

actually intelligible only through the fact that they are abstracted from individual matter; and in so far as they are
actually intelligible are they one with the intellect.

There-

fore, by very nature the universal must be immaterial, and
the idea must be universal; as a result the intelleot, which
has the idea as its proper obJect, must be immaterial. 29
In describing the mode in which the intellect acts as a
spiritual faculty St. Thomas introduces

t~

new terms: possible

intellect (intellectus possibilis) and active intellect (intellectus agens).

The intellect is a passive potency, since

.

.

it can possess universal forms and essences; it resembles a
clean slate upon which the ideas are to be formed by the active intellect. 30

As an active poteney the intellect through

the spiritually effective force, the active intellect, illumines the sensible phantasms, and by abstracting from all
individual and sensitive detail it releases the intelligible
universal species which in turn informs the possible intellect
and brings it into act. 31

The sensible phantasms Offered by

29 Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 50: "Intellectus ••• non potest
esse compositus ex materia et forma individuali; species enim
rerum intellectarum fiunt intelligibiles actu per hoc quod a
materia individuali abstrahuntur;secundum autem quod sunt intelligibiles actu, fiunt unum cum intellectu; unde et intellectum oportet esse' absque materia ino.ividuali. fI
30 Summa, I, 14, 2 ad 3.
31 Meyer, 2E. cit., 187.

4
the imagination are not efficient causes of knowledge, but

.,

rather the instrumental agents ln the process of knowing.

St.

Thomas is not one to deny Aristotle's "Nil in intellectu guod
~

prius fuerit in sensu; for him the human intel1ect is

bound to its corporeal sensitive existence and by its nature
tends to the forms of material things.

Yet as a sniritual

faculty the intellect rises far above the sensible world, because its adequate object which is the nature or essence of
things, is the product of a spiritual operation proceeding
only from a spiritual faculty.
The second faculty of the soul, called by St. Thomas the
will or the intellectual appetite 32 , supplements the first
faculty; together they form'the essence of the soul, in which
they are rooted as interdepending principles.

Although these

two faculties are specifically different, due to the differenc
between their proper objects, they hav.e much in common, principally the fact that they are immaterial potencies without
corporeal organs.

The spirituality of the will follows di-

rectly from that of the intellect.
Now it is precisely because man is an intelligent creature that he enjoys the power of free-will.

By means of his

intellect he can set goals for himself, and pronose suitable
methods for their attainment; by it he can determine what shal
be the last practical judgment respecting his preference of
32

Summa, I, 87, 4.

one means over another.
th~t

fact,

It is this practical judgment, in

.,

gives the will reason to act at all, since the will

waits for the presentation of an object sufficient to move the
will to ac tion.

~

The cognitive faculty provides the evalua-

ting judgment and offers counsel as to whichcobject is to be
preferred, while the appetitive faculty supplies the approval
or disapproval.

Thus, we can safely state that the root of

'.

freedom is in the reason as well as in the will; it is in the
reason as in its cause and in the will as in its subject.
And, as St. Thomas remarks, the will can turn freely to several different objects only because the reason has revealed
the good in these objects. 33
When a man looks about him in the world and sees myriads
of other kinds of creatures fixedly determined to certain ways
of action, he knows that as a free being he mus,t be very special, one worthy of honor and full of dignity.

He knows that

he can perform a deed or not perform it, that he can do it in
this way or in another, while these other creatures -- earthbound by nature -- have not 'Such powers.

He will r,easonably

conclude that he and all other men possess a power that is
exe~t

from the' determining eonditions of matter.

This power

.--------------

33

Ibid., I-II, 17, 1, ad 2: "Ad secundum dicendum, quod radix libertatis est voluntas sieut subjeetum; sed s-iout eausa,'
est ratio; ex hoc enim voluntas libere potest ad diversa ferri
quia ratio pot est habere diversas, conoeptiones boni. Et ideo
philosophi definiunt liberum arbitrium, quod est liberum de
ratione judieium, quasi ratio sit eausa libertatis."

rr

of willing gives evidence of a will-faculty.

~

According to the
~

philosoPhical axiom, "action follows being," (actio sequitur

-

esse) as a being is, so must it act.

-

(In more familiar form,

this is a variant statement of the principl"e of causality:
"The effect cannot transcend its cause,tt or ttWhatever becomes

must have a proportionate cause.")

Thus, we know that the im-

material effect of willing must proceed from the immaterial
cause, the will.
If someone argues that the will is determined to a common
object to which it inclines naturally, namely the good in general, we can agree with St. Thomas that this inclination is
only another proof of the willIs spirituality.

.

St. Thomas

distinguishes between the will considered as nature and as
~;

he states, ttSince ••• the will is an immaterial power like

the intellect, some one general thing corresponds to it naturally, which is the good; just as to the intellect there corresponds some one general thing, which is the true •••• "34
The power

~o

will supplements tbe power to think; knowledge

-- apprehension of Truth -- leads volition -- desire of Goodness -- to action.

The will, like the intellect in man, is

revealed as a ,piritual faculty of man's spiritual soul.
Now that

we~have

briefly outlined st. Thomas' exposition

34 Ibid., I-II, 10, 1, ad 3: nCum igitur voluntassit quaedam vis immaterialis, sicut et intellectus, respondet ei naturaliter aliquodunum commune, 8ilicat bonum, sicut etiam
intellect'Ui aliquod unum commune, "scilicet verum."

rr

of the two powers, of the soul we can investigate the nature of
~

the soul as such.

First, we know that the soul is a spiritual

something; this fact has been proVen in our review of the
spirituality of the two powers of the soul.
~aterial

Just as the im-

operations of knowing and willing proceed from the

immate~lal

causes, intellect and will; so must an immaterial

intellect and an immaterial will find sufficient cause for
their existence as faculties of an immaterial soul.

Defining

soul as "the first principle of life," St. Thomas begins his
"Treatise on Man" by proving that the soul is necessarily
spiri tual:

••• no body can be. the first prin-,
c.;iple of life. For lt ls clear
that to be a prlnciple Of life, .
or to be a living thing, does not
belong to a body as a body, since,
lf that were the case, every body
would be a living thing, or a principle of life. Therefore a body
is competent to be a living thing,
or even a. prlnciple of 11fe, as
such a body_ Now that it is actually such a body it owes to S)'me
principle which is called its act.
Therefore, the SOul, which is the
flrst prlnciple ofllfe, is not a
body, but the act of a body; just
as heat, which is the principle of
calefactlon, is not a body but an
act of a body. 35

35 Ibid., I, 75, I: ." ••• aliquod corpus non potest esse primum
principium vitae. Manifestum' est enim quod esse principlum
vitae, vel vlvens non convenit corpori ex hoc quod est corpus;
alloquin omnecorpus ,eset vlvens aut principium vitae. Convenlt igltur alicul corpori quod sit vlvens, vel etiam prlncipium vitae, per hoc quod est tale corpus. Quod autem est
actutale habet hoc ab allquo principio, quod dicituractus
ejus. Anima igitur quae est primum princlpium vitae, non est
corpus, sed corporis actus; sicut calor, qui est pripciplum
calefaotionis non est cor s sed uldam cor orls actus."

'1'

..

The second question St. Thomas aalte about the soul is
whether it is subSistent, that is, does it have a nature all
its own, or does it depend entirely upon the body for its being as such.

I

His answer is:

Therefore the intellectual principle,
which we call the mind of the intellect, has essentially an operation
in which the body does not share.
Now only that which subsists in itself can have an operation in itself.
For nothing ~an operate but what is
actual, and so a thing operates ac~
cording as it is.'36
Gilson appeals to the doctrine of matter and form to prove, that
the soul has subsistence.

He argues:

••• although the man alone fully deserves the name of substance, he
nevertheless owes all his substantiality to that of the soul. For
the human soul is act, and is therefore a thing for itself and a substancejthe body, on the contrary,
although without it the soul cannot
develop the fullness of its actuality,
has neither actuality nor subsistence,
save those received from its. form,
that is to say from the soul,,_37
The sO'I.J.l of man does not need the body in the, same way that
the body needs the soul.

Since the soul is the informing prin

ciple, the'body without this principle remains non-existent;
the soul, on the other hand, remains subsistent whether the
36 Ibid., I, 75, 2:' "Ipsum igitur intellectuale principium,
quod d1citur mens vel intellectus, habet operationem per se,
cui non commu'iiICit corpus. Nihil autem potest per se operari,
nisi quod per se subsistit. Non enim est operari nisi entis
in actu. Unde eo modo aliquid operatur quo est."
37 Q2. cit., 187

51
body stays united to it or not.

And this brings us to the
~

last and perhaps the most important consideration concerning
the soul --

i~s

immortality.

What has been already said about the spirituality and
substantiality of the soul offers much more than an introduction to the proofs of the soul's incorruptibility.

st.

Thom~s

presupposes that the soul is spiritual and subsistent, when
he begins his arguments for its incorruptibility.

He claims

that a thing may be corrupted in one of two ways: in itself
and accidentally.

Taking for granted that tae human soul has

being in-itself, it follows that it cannot be accidentally
generated or corrupted, that is, by the generation or corruption of something, else, since generation and corruption belong to a thing in the same way that being belongs to it.
Things which do not subsist, such as accidents and mere material forms, acquire being or lose it through the generation
or corruption of composites.

Seeondly, whatever is subsis-

tent, such as the human soul, cann<;>t be corrupted in::ltself,
because being belongs to a form, such as the human soul, Bl
virtue of itself and is therefore inseparable from it.

Matter

acquires actual being according as it acquires form; it loses
being aooording as it loses form.
ted from itself, and- thus it is
form to cease to exist. 38

---------,...----
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Summa, I, 75,6.

But form cannot be separa-

impOss~ble

for a subsistent

In a word, the dissolution of

,

man I s body (matter), which owes its being to man's soul (form),
41

can in no way affect the being of the soul-itself, for being
I

~aturally

(by virtue of itself) belongs to the soul, and can-

not be separated from it.
A difficulty that immediately suggests itself, and one
that has important consequences in our study of the nature of
the human soul, is presented by st.

Thomas thus: "Whether the

separated soul
can understand anything?"
-,
To solve this difficulty we must
consider that nothing act.s except
so far as it is actual, and therefore the mode of action in every
agent follows from the mode of its
being. Now the soul has one mode
of being when in the body, and ~n. other when apart from it, though
its nature remains the same. 39
St. Thomas continues by telling just how the mode o"f'thinking
in a soul joined with a body differs from that of a "separated
soul."

In the first existence the soul necessarily depends

on corporeal phantasms, which are in corporeal organs; in the
second existence it turns to pure intelligibles, as is proper
to

sep~rate

substances.

Althougn knowledge through pure in-

telligibles is in itself a nobler method of understanding,
still it is not natural to intellects joined to bodies, else
39 Ibid., I, 89,1: "Et ideo ad hanc difficultatemtollendam
considerandum est quod cum nihil operetur nisi inquantum est
actu, modus operandi uniuscujusqu~ rei se.qui tur modurn essendi
ipsius. Rabet autem anima alium modum essendi, cum unitur
corpori, et cum fuerit a corpore separata, manente tamen
eadem animae.natura."

.

men would have been created without corporeal sense organs and
without the power of properly knowing sensible things from
the things themselves.

Therefore, it is for the soul's good

that it-is united to a body, and that it understands by tur Tl1T1 e
to the phantasms; yet it is possible for it to exist apart
from the body and also to understand in another way.
Now this again presents a problem.

If the soul is inde-

pendent of the body even in thought process, It would seem
that it is so sufficient in itself that its union with the
body is no more than accidental.

Or we might be led to con-

clude that man is ·a third substance compounded of two other
substances

body and soul.

Now St. Thomas ineiststhat the

union of body and soul is a substantial union: man is a complex substance which owes its substantiality to only one of
its constitutive principles, that is, to the soul; man is
neither body, which subsists only by the soul, nor soul, which
would remain, according to his nature, destitute without the
body; man is the substantial unity of soul, which substant~a
lizes the body, and of body, in'which the soul subsists. 40
Thus when someone says

"1

know," he does not mean that his

body knows, nor that his soul know.s, nor that his soul knows
by means of his body, but that a concrete being "I," taken in
its unity, performs an act of knowing.

The soul of man cannot

develop its activity without. the cooperation of sensorial
40

Ibid., I, 75, 4; 76, 5; 89, 1.

organs, and in prder to obtain this cooperation it must actua#

lize the body, which would not be without the soul; yet the
soul is not itself save in a body.

The nature of the soul is

such, however, that even though the body corrupts, the soul
continues in being, how different so-ever the mode may be.
To return to our starting point concerning the definition
,

of "person," is to discover that "human person tl is but a synonym for "man."

Man, we have seen, is a substantial unity of

matter and form, but

bec~use

his form is a spiritual, sub-

sistant, incorruptible principle, it should be emphasized.
The matter, on the other hand, is not to be despised; it does
have a dignity of its own.

The important point, however, is

that the matter's worthiness is designed for the perfection
of the form, and that man's dignity comes not from the matter
but from the spirituality, substantiality, and incorruptibility of the form.

It is this dignity that identifies man with

his personality.

From our discussion of individuating notes

we must recall that although matter is the principle of individuation, once individuated it is the form that is individual, because "it is the subsistence of this individual form
which, investing matter with its own proper existence, permits the individual to subsist!~l

And since the form of man

is his soul, we begin to see how really important this soul
must be.
41

Men are individuals, but more, they are human

G11son,.Q.E. c1 t., 200-201..

persons; the natures of their souls make them such.
#

Having reviewed the nature of man, the human person, with
his body-soul unity, we can now investigate his origin as a
human person.

First we must observe with the Angelic Doctor 42

that by his nature man stands midway between corruptible and
incorruptible creatures, since his soul is naturally incorruptible and his body is naturally corruptible.

"Man," claims

st. Thomas, "in a certain sense contains all things •••• his
reas on, whic h makes him 1 ike to the angel s (-incorrupt i bl e) ;
his sensitive .powers, whereby he is like the animals; his
natural powers, which liken him to the plants; and the body
itself, wherein he is like to inanimate things. ,t43

It thus

seems that all matter aims at the ultimate form, the form of
man: prime matter in potency to the forms' of the elements,
they in potency to the forms of the mixed bodies, they in po-

.

tency to the vegetative soul, it in pmtency to the sensitive
soul, and it in potency to the

intel~-ctual

soul.

And beyond

this-the soul is the connecting link with the purely spiritual
intell igences .
42 Summa, I, 98,1: "Est ergo considerandum quod homo secundum
suam naturam est constitutus quasi medium quoddam inter creaturascorruptibiles et incorruptibiles; nam anima ejus- est naturaliter incorruptibilis, corpus vero naturaliter corruptibile. "
43 Ibid., I, 96,2: " ••• in homine quodammodo sunt emnia •••• Est
autem in homine quatuor considerare, scilicet rationem, secundum quam convenit cum angelisj vires sensitivas, secundum quas
convenit cum animalibus; vires naturales secundum quas convenit cum plantisj et ipsum corpus, secundum quod conventt cum
rebus inanimatis."

To understand fully the soul's dignity we must look to

.,

.

its ultimate source of being,
that is, to its creation.
,
'

The creation of man suggests the fact that he is a contingent being,which in turn argues for tte existence of one
principle of being from which all contingent things, in whatever way existing, have their being; this principle must be
"the uncaused cause,

fI

the first and the ultimate reason for

being, the Creator from whom all creation 'proceeds:~ 44

Thus we

must understand God if we would truly know the meaning of
creation.

Since, according to st. Thomas, creation is the

production of something from nothing (the "from" indicating a
negation and expressing an order of things) there must be one

-

absolutely Neeessarj!' and Pure Being, who can of Htmself make
something out of nothing, and who alone will be the origin of
being.
Since all contingent 'beings are made according to their
different natures, the nature of man's soul will determine
its mode of creation.

Because the rational soul is a spiri-

tual, subsistent form, it cannot be made of pre-existing matter (whether Gorporeal, which would render it a corporeal being, or spiritual, which would involve the transmutation of
one spiritual subs,tance into another).

Nor can it be made

through the action or any created pure spirit, since it would
presuppose something to its act and Qe capable of acting only
44

Ib id., I, 65, I •
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by producing a change in matter, of which the soul is no
part. 45

~

Therefore, the rational soul must be created imme-

diately by a uncreated Pure Spirit, and this is God.

Because ..

the soul is naturally the informing principle of man's body,
it cannot be created by itself as though

~t

were a complete

species, but must be created in the body, which is the proper
potentiality ~ which the soul is the proper act. 46
The nature of the body will also affect its creation.

Be

sides the fact that the materiality of the body demands that
it come from pre-existing matter, whether it be the EHime of
the earth or the semen-ovum union, there must be an apt disposition in a body, which depends upon a soul for its substantiality.

Since the proximate end of the human body is the

rational soul, and its operations, in the same way that matter is fbr the form, God fashioned the body in the disposition
that was best to serve the soul and its. operation of thinking
and willing.

"If defect exists in the human body," says st.

Thomas, "it is well to observe that such defect arises, as a
necessary result of the matter, from the conditions required
in the body in order to make it suitably proportioned to the

45 Ibid., I, 90, 2, ad 3.
46 Ibid., I, 90, 4 sed contra: "'actus proprius fit in potentra-propria.' Cum ergo anima sit proprius actus corporis
anima producaaest in corpore.'!
ad 1: "Sed quia naturaliter
est forma corporis, non fuit seorsum creanda, sed debuit creari in corpore."

rr~------~----~
j

soul and its operations. 1147

As an example of the body's subiii

servience to the good of the soul, he tells how man has an
erect stature, so that his superior part, his head, is turned
towards the heavens, and his inferior part is turned towards
the earth; other animals have their heads turned down so that
they can more easily seek food and procure a livelihood, while
man is able to survey the heavenly and earthly things around
him and so gather intelligible truth from them and have freedom in using his spiritual faculties. 48
We can truly say that man's rational nature is given even
greater dignity by reason of the SOUl's being created as it
is, and by reason of the body's being created for the soul.
Now why is this true?
(if it may be called

From'what does this greater dignity
greate~)

come?

answer by asking another question:
is in

m~?"

St. Thomas gives the
"Whether the image of God

He wants to know .if something of the Creator mani

fests itself in the creature.

To get at the full meaning of

this problem we must distinguish the kinds of Creator-manifestations.
Since all things look to too. Universal First Cause as the
ul timate source of both their being and their operations, all'

47 Ibid., I, 91,3: "Et si aliquis defectus in dispositione hu
mani-coTporis esse videtur, considerandum est quod talis defectus sequitur ex necessitate materiae ad ea quaerequiruntur
in corpore, ut sit debita proportio ipsius ad animam et ad
animae operationes."
48 Loc. cit., ad 3.

must necessarily resemble the Creator in some respect; for

.,

every effect in some way or other must represent its cause.
Some effects represent only the causality of their cause, but
not its form; their representation is referred to as a trace,
for a trace indicates ,that something or someone has passed by,
without disclosing the passer-by's identity.

Other effects

represent their cause by a likeness of form; this is called
representation of image.

Now all

~hings

resemble God in that

they have being; some of them in that they have life; others
in that they have rationality.

Only reason-endowed creatures,

such as man, approach near enough to the Being of their First
Cause to merit the title, image of God,49 because only they
bear a specific resemblance to God through their spiritual
onerations of knowing and willing. 50
The conclusions brought forward 'Oy man's likeness to his
Creator suggest themselves: 1) the image of God is not found
in irrational creatures, because they do not manifest a specific likeness to God;5 1 2) pure spirits are more like to God
than are men, because the intellects of pure spirits are more
49' The important requisite for a true image is that it must
proceed from another like to it in species, or at least in
specific sign. 'Ibid., 1,35,1.
50 Lest man take too much dignity for himself, st. Thomas
warns us that it is more correct to say that man is,Uto the
image of God," than to call him simply "image of God,~' al-,
though if correctly understood we may call the human person an
image of God. Ibid., 1,93,1, ad 2.
51 Ibid., I,93~

perfect;5 2 3) the image of God 1s found in every man because
#

of his. creation as a rational animalj53 4) the image of God is
found in the acts of the soul, because these acts are specifically like (no matter how

i~perfectly)

those of God, and the

more perfectly men use their faculties of intellect and will,
the more perfectly will they liken themselves to Him, who is
AII-Perfect.54

Perhaps we understand now what St. Thomas

meant when he wrote, "Person signifies what is most perfect in
all nature,"55 and what Gilson meant by the words, "We are
persons because we are the work of a Person •••• To be a person
is to participate in one of the highest excellences of the
divine being."5 6
52 Ibid., 1,93,3.
53 Ibid., 1,93,4.
54 IbId., 1,93,7.
55 Ibid., 1,29,3: " ••• persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura."
56 QE. cit., 205 •
.' lTwo corollary thoughts proc·eeding from the fact of man
created-like-to-God suggest themselves; one in the form of a
grace from God, the other in the form of an obligation upon
man. The first thought is that of God's providence, which
comes directly from the heart of creation. It would be incredible for God to present certain creatures with rational
faculties specifically like His own, and then to neglect these
creatures for the rest of their immortal existence. If it is
reasonable to expect God to care for incorruptible creatures
that bear merely traces of His specific nature, how much more
will He protect and care for those who are intimately bound to
Him by their very personalities. The second thought is that of
man's subordinate attitude towards his Creator, and of his obliga~ion of prayer to Him.
Since prayer is an act of the reason, it is proper to a rational creature; since it is an act
intended only for the reverence and honor of God through love
of Him, it above all acts is the most perfect.

The final point that enters into our analysis of the dig-

.,

nity of the human person comes naturally from an understanding
of the nature and origin of man.
his destiny.

Why does man exist?

Now we wish to deal with
Why does he ex.ist as he is?

And how does he achieve the purpose of his particular existence?
The first decision that even the most cursory student of
Scholastic philosophy would make in regard to this philosophy
is that it is theocentric.

Almost no problem in metaphYSics,

psychology, or e.thics can be raised without relating it to
God; in a true philosophy He must always remain the beginning,
the center, the end; for He alone is Being, the source of be+

· participants of Being must reing, and. the fund to which the
turn.
God.

All life is, in a sense, a circle from God, back to
Now in discussing the why of man, who, as we have seen,

stands midway between purely rational and purely irrational
beings, we must keep in mind the divine attributes'of God, who
is not determined by His nature to depend upon anything outside Himself.

We are not seeking a cause of the oreative act

of God whereby men came to be, for the oreative act is God Him
self; He has no cause, He Himself is cause.

To seek a cause

for God's own Will would imply an existence prior to Him or
would demand a distinction of powers or attributes in God, who
is Himself perfect One-ness.

But to seek the end or purpose

of God's acts is another question.

If we denied that the Will

of God had an end for its acts, then we would be subjecting
41

God to blind necessity or irrational contingency, either of
which would certainly limit the perfection of God.

What we

can reasonably say, however, is that it would be contradictory
for God in creatiTIg to have any other end than Himself; the
only- possible end.of the divine Will is the Divine Being, and
since this Being is identical with the Good, we may say that
the only possible end for God is His own perfection.

All these

pre-notes are understood by St. Thomas when he quotes

St~

Au-

gustine's phrase, "Because God is good, we exist. tl5'
Generally speaking, an end is that towards which the movement of an agent tends; if there were no purpose in view, the
agent would not act; when the purpose is attained he ceases
acting.

Again we may state that every agent by his action

tends to

~me

definite good thing; this statement is

~oven

from the fact that all action and movement is direC:f,ed in
some way to being, either for the preservation or acquisition
of being; now being is a good; thus all action and movement is
directed to good, which may be def ined as Uthe ob ject. of every

appetite.,t~

Pressing this same argument to its ultimate

limits we immediately see that the ultimate end of all created
things must be the good that is ultimate and supreme.
there is but one s preme and ultimate good, God.

5?
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Now

Thus we not

Summa, I, 19, 4, ad 3: " ••• quia Deus ·bonus est, sumus."
Contra Gentiles, III, 3.

Glory, in general, is a kind of manifestation of perfec4i

tion; according to st. Ambrose it is "clear knowledge with
praise" (clara

~

laude notitia).

We know that it·results

from two acts, one of the intellect, and the other of the will;
therefore, on11 a rational creature can glorify anything.

In

relation to God we note two kinds of possible glory: intrinsic
whereby God perfectly knows Himself and praises Himself, extrinsic whereby rational creatures know and praise their God
in as perfect a manner as they are capable of doing.

From

what we have alreadysaicl about God, who is the source and
object of all being, it becomes apparent that human persons
will have certain obligations towards ,Him, who gave then personality; they will need to glorify God

explicit~y

by their

acts of knowledge and love of Him, and implicitly by turning
their intellects only to truth and their wills only to what
is good.

In a word, men will have the obligation of always

being reasonable, which is another way of describing a human
person.
Beatitude, the other aspect of man's final end, can be
defined as "the perfect good that satisfies the appetite completely.,,6D

Since we know that man necessarily and always

seeks a good end for all his actions and movements, ultimately
he will have to seek the ultimate good end.
61> Summa, I-II, 2,8:
quletat appetitum."

It • • •

Now if through

bonum perfectum quod totaliter

the process of elimination we were to apply the various nends n
41

as st. Thomas has done in the

men might take as ultimate

second book of his Summa, or as St. Augustine does in his Confessions, and Francis Thompson. in tiThe Hound of Heaven" -- we
"-

will discover that only He, who is the First Cause, the Pure
Act, the All-Being, is Himself the Person, with whom these
lesser persons seek to identify themselves by means of their
person-powers given to them by God.
In summary, the metaphysical argument of the Scholastics
puts the spot-light on the essence of man; it tells us that
he is more than'an individual, that he is a human person,

~

unity of body and soul, whose principal operations are those

.

of knowing and wil=!-ingj it tells us that the body and soul
come from God, the body mediately, the soul immediately and
made to the image of God Himself, and that the soul must return to its Creator for an immortal existence.

This basic

concept of man is not entirely verifiable in sense-experience,
although it does have criteria

~nd

proofs

staunchly un-

assailable 'ones -- which reveal to the honest student of man
not merely a half-picture but a complete description of man
~

he

~:

a human person a creature of dignity.

The ScholaS-

tic. admits the existence of man's body and its necessity for
the fulfillment of a truly human life; he also sees dignity
in that same body, but a dignity of parts subordinated to the
well-being of the whole, of delicate members caring for the

F

!

nourishment of the entire structure and for the propagation of
#

other bodies like to it; yet he goes beyond the body's merely
physical existence and there finds a reason for that existence.
The Scholastic follows the reliable dictates of his reason
when he says that the iesser must lead to the greater, the
crasser to the nobler; he sees in man a higher life than that
of vegetation and sensation, and he thinks that it -- the intellectual life -- must be the master, while the less noble
must serve.

He sees in this intellectual life, called "soul",

an image that gives it greater value than the 'whole physical
universe.

And he says this is man.

We began our thesis by writing of a "basic foundation,"
and we have found it in the dignity of the human person •. What
this concept of man has to do with the relations of men in
society becomes immediately evident.
it is not man.

There

ar~

Either this is man or

no half-men, half-brutes -- although

some men may seem to have cast off their rational natures for
the irrationality of purely animal existence.

The accidental

physical characteristics of individual men in no way affect
their essences as rational beings.

To ask "How big is man?"

or ttWbat color is man?tt is to show ignorance about the most
fundamental concept of reality.

To emphasize any purely phy-

sical characteristic of a man is to insult the essential dignity of that man and to
Achille writes:

~warf

one's own nature.

Mr. Louis

In defining himself by the traits
of his ethnic group a man travesties
the true dignity of his own human
personality; ignoring his essence,
he chooses to exist in its accidents,
and attempts to degrade -- if it
were in his power -- his own person
to the rank of nonhuman creature.6t

#

The man who emphasizes his· body traits to the detriment of his
soul's essence is like the idiotic ruler that amuses himself
with his crown' and his regal robe, and

thinks nothing of his

kingship.61
Now it is our contention that so long as the true understanding of the nature, origin, and destiny of man -- as expressed in the metaphysics of Scbolastic philosophy -- is neglected, so long as the material is placed over the spiritual,
the soul made servant to the body, then mankInd, no matter how
intricate or highly specialized his civilization may be, will
despair of itself and endanger its chances of ever attaining
the peace and happiness which it madly craves and which it has
the power to enJoy not only during the few moments on this
earth but forever.

6'1 Louis T. Achille, "What Color, Man?" Democracy Should It
Survive? The Bruce Publishing Company, Milwaukee, 1943, 109:
bZLoc. cit.
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CHAPTER IV
THE SCHOLASTIC ANSWER: ETHICAL
In studying man's personality we find that his rational
nature imposes upon him certain obligations towards God, himself, and other men, and confers upon him corresponding absolute rights which assure his fulfilling these obligations.

It

is this problem of obligations and rights that will determine
to a greater or less extent the success of human relationships.
This is the snecial problem for those men who have tried to
degrade the soul-part of certain other men by despising some
accidental characteristic, such as color of skin, which makes
up the body-part of them.

Those who degrade their fellow

creature's personality are under definite obligations which
they have forgotten.

They who are the objects of this deg-

radation have definite rights that must be protected, if not
by themselves then by other members of human society.
The Scholastic q.octrine of human rights is baseq.. on the
metaphysical foundation of man's essential dignity as a human
person.

Mants dignity is the necessary ttreason-for-beingtf of

man's natural rights.

(In the most ultimate sense only God,

the First-Cause, can be the primary cause of human rights; in
reBtion to Him, we say that the human person is the secondary
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proximate foundation, but a true foundation nonetheless.)l

.,

Because man has an intellect, which gives him the power to
exercise control over them, he must use these powers for the
development of his personality.

Man knows only one dependence,

that of his being with relation to the Creator, but this dependence, far from alienating him confirms him in his being,
since it binds him to that which communicates to him intelligenoe and will.2

For this reason his person may be called

absolute (ab-solutus, detached from other things), and he
may be said to be an end in himself.

Within himself he has

the faculties.to develop himself; outside himself he has the
obligation to direct these faculties to the proximate' goal,
his

o~n

person, and to the ultimate goal, God.

In order for manto attain the goals for which he naturally exists, he needs certain safeguards that will assure
him of 'freedom in this attainment.

These safeguards we call

natural rights or "inviolable mora.l claims to personal goods
••• whioh a man acquires with, his nature ••• designed as means
for attaining his natural end."3 These rights are not derived
from any positive authority, but prooeed immediately from
1 Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P., Summa Theologiae Moralis,
2nd edition. Descless de Brower and C., Paris, Vol. II, uDe
Virtutibus Moralibus," 1935, 159.
2 Joseph T. Delos, O.P., "The Rights of the Human Person
vis-a-vis of the State and the Race," Race: Nation: Person,48.
3 Francis J. Gilligan, ~ Morality of the Color Line. The
Catholic Univermty of America Press, Washington, I928, 39.

r
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man's rational nature and are directed immediately to the
ttl

well-being of the human person possessing that nature; that
is, they are natural to man and for man; they may be defined
as "extensions of personality.tt4
Since, therefore, man's natural rights are intimately
concerned with the obligations imposed by the nature, origin
and destiny of his very being, they are so necessary and so
sacred for him that all men are mor&ly restrained from interfering with them or ignoring them.

In order to protect

these rights all men are obliged to exercise a special moral
virtue, called justice.
as

~the

due. u5

This virtue is defined by st. 'Thomas

perpetual and constant will to give everyone his
With Aristotle, St. 'Thomas distinguishes three kinds

of justic'e: a particular justice, divided into 1) commutative
and 2) distributive; and 3) a general justice, called legal
or social.

As Father Meyer points out, this distinction
"corresponds to the essential structure of the community which manifests
a three-fold relationship: thta relation of the members among themselves,
the relation of the whole to the members, and the relation of the members
to the whole."6

The first relationship brings with it the moral obligation of
one person's giving to another person his due, thus preserving
an absolute equality between the thing owed (debitum) and the

4 William J. Kerby. The Social Mission of Charity.

The Catholic University of America Press, 'aillngton, rep. 1944, 55.
5 Summa, II-II,58,l: " ••• perpetua et constans voluntasius
suum unlquique tribuens."

r
thing given:' (datum).

The second imposes an obI igation on the
~

governors of a community to distribute among the members an
equal proportion of burdens and rewards according to the needs
and receptive cauacities of the members.

The last relation-

ship presents the virtue of social justice, by which the members of a community are obliged to observe and promote laws
for the common welfare. 7
Just as there is a special moral virtue that protects
men's natural rights, so is there a special vice opposed to
that virtue.

St. Thomas says, ft ••• as the object of justice

in external things is something equal, so the object of injustice is something unequal, that is, a person gets more or
less than he deserves. ft8 It is unjust to deny a man his natural rights or to hinder without a reasonable cause his free
use of them.

We say "without a reasonable cause," because,

although man's natural rights are absolute in existence, they
are not absolute in extent; they are subject to limitations
that will depend on the will of only the person in whom they
inhere.

For example, since a man has a right to live, not

7 Summa, II. 58.5,7,8: 61.1,2; 62.1. (According to st. Thomas
restitution is demanded only for a violation of commutative
justice, because there must be perfect equality between the
thing owed and the thing given, i.e., the thing possessable
and possessed by two distinct individuals. In distributive
and social justice the man having .the right is himself a part
of the whole, and cannot owe anything to himself nor make. restitution to himself.)
8 Ibid., II-II,59,2: n ••• sicut objectum justitiae est aliquid
aequale in rebus exterioribus, ita etiam objectum injustitiae
est aliquid inaequale, prout scilicet alicui attribuitur plus
vel mimls uam sibi competat. tt
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even the State in order to preserve its own existence may di~.

rectly and deliberately put an innocent man to death.

The

natural right to life belongs in an absolute way to all men,
and in itself it is prior to any claim the State may have in
opposition to it.

Man as a human person is autonomous in re-

lation to the State, which has meaning only in relation to
the welfare of its members.

W~en,

however, an individual

member gravely and willingly offends against the just law of
the State, he may be justly deprived of freedom to life or
even exeouted by the State.

But the right to life is limited

only by the free-will action of the person possessing the
right. 9
Now it is a speoial kind of injustice to deny that this
or that man has any natural rights at all, beoause natural
rights are substantially equal in all men 1 although their extension will depend upon the various oapacities and needs of
the persons concerned.

The right to a higher education, for

example, will include more opportunities for self-improvement
in the cases of those who have greater capacities for learning
But for all men the natural right will embrace a oertain minimum of eduoation that is necessary for preserving and developing men acoording to the reasonable needs of their personalities.

Because all men are equal in the nature, origin, and

9 This free-will aotion may be more or less deliberate on the
part of the actor; for example, when a member of a State at
war dons a uniform of his country, he thereby becomes a military target.

destiny of their !ruman persons, their ri.ghts, which are

tl

ex-

~

tensi.ons of personality," will be equal in kind, number, and
sacredness.

To deny that a particular man or group of men

have natural rights is to deny that they are men.

1·

A blow aim-

ed at a person's rights is a blow aimed at the essence of
that person.

Without rights men cannot fulfill the ob1iga-

tions imposed upon them as human persons; without rights they
cannot be at all.
A second consequence of any form of injustice is that
the natural rights of all men suffer when the rights of one
man or one group of men are attacked.

The reason for this is

that "such an attack can be justified only by setting aside
the ethical doctrine as to the objectivity and primacy of
all and every form of human rights

~

validity to any individual c1aim. fl10

rights which alone gives
An attempt to destroy,

if it were possible, the essential equality existing between
all men results in a complete destruction of all men's intrinsic worthiness ·and consequently all natural rights.
It is but a short step from general ethical principles
to the particular question at hand.

Since natural rights

belong to all men because they are men, these rights must
flow from the essential constituents of men's persons and not
from their accidental characteristics of soul or body.
10 John La Farge, The Race iuestion and the Negro.
Green, and Co., New York, 19 4, 80.

Longmans,

r__
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In order to analyze more clearly the ethical argument

.,

we will specify those human rights that all men must equally
have to fulfill the reasonable demands of their personalities.
Following the Jeffersonian division we will group these rights
under the headings: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

The most nerfectly absolute natural right man has is

that of possessing the means necessary for the attainment of
his ultimate end; all other rights must remain subordinate
to this one; all other rigbts,'j;n"-a-sense, will be the means
'nan needs.

We call these riehts inal ienable because they

nroceed from the intrinsic nature of an absolute being, although contingent in relation to God, and because they direct
their possessor to an ul tima.te goal of self-perfection through
the participation of his being in the Divine Being.
The first of man's inalienable rights (subordinate to
the one perfectly absolute right) is that of existence, presupposing the creative act, and of obtaining the means that
are necessary for the sustenance of his existence.

So ne-

cessary, indeed, is the right to exist that a man in extreme
need may take another man's property to satisfy his need.
The right to life is prior to the.right to possess property;
the right of the first man supersedes that of the second.
Thomas claims that a

m~n

St.

in such need may take what is ne-

cessary, whether he does so covertly or in the open, because
things that are

s~perabundant

for some men are by natural

right the necessary means of sustaining the poor. 14

.,Conse-

quent upon the first inalienable right are those to property,
to work, and to receiving a wage adequate to care for oneself
and family according to a standard befitting the dignity of
human persons.
The right to pronerty is part of the general right a
man has to possess the goods of the earth for satisfying the
reasonable need of his person.

Ordinarily men need personal

property in order to feed and clothe themselves, to raise and
protect their family, and to safeguard their other rights,
such as that to freedom and pursuit of happiness.

By their

physical make-up and their spiritual faculties of intellect
and will they have the powers by which they can reasonably
use external goods to satisfy 'their needs.

Three further

reasons for the right to property are suggested by st. Thomas:
1) things owned in common are usually neglected by the majority, who lack interest in the things not imtimately connected with themselves; 2) ordinarily human affairs are well
directed for the welfare of both individuals and the common
good, if the care of the good is left to individual persons;

3) a more perfect community is preserved

14

Summa, II-II, 66,7_

wh~n

each man rests

77

content with what he has as his own. 15
iii

.Man's right to work in order to receive a wage adequate
to care for himself and his family in a manner befitting the
dignity of himself and his family is necessary for the preservation and development of his person.

Without this right

his right to life would be meaningless, since this right is
the means that assures him of his right to life and his right
to attain his destiny.

Without a certain amount of material

possessions man's needs cannot be satisfied.

Since God made

the earth for all men, and since men usually must get their
livelihood from the earth by labor, all men in general have
equal rights over the material goods of the earth.

But in

specific cases men's rights differ, depending first on their
needs and secondly on their capacities.

A man with a family

of ten, for example, will have a greater need for

materi~l

goods, and therefore a greater right to them than the man
with only a wife to support.

It is chiefly the duty of the

State to see that an "equal" (according to needs) distribution
of goods be preserved among its members.

After the needs of

men are taken care of ,then men's rights to the world's goods
will depend on their natural capacities to receive them.

The

15 St. Thomas further states (Ibid. 11-11,66,2.) that the
urg'e to strive fer a lasting poSS'e'Bsion of external things
corresponds directly to a man's natural urge to care for his
family, as well as to his human characteristic of helping
.
others. (Ibid.,II-II,32, 5 ad 3) Property should be private
with respect to the power of acquisition and disposal but
common as regards its use. Ibid., 11-11,118,1; 66, 2, ad 2.

man with a stronger back or with more skilled hands or with
~

a keener mind will have a greater right than his weaker or
slower or duller brother.

But if we consider the actual

economic order as it exists in the United States, where a
)

part of the people possess most of the wealth, we must insist
that the laborers who perform reasonable amounts of useful
work have rights - equal to those of the owners of the earth to a decent livelihood not only for themselves but for their
families as well. 16

Although it isjust for men to make free

contracts with their masters who Itbuy" their labor, still the
masters must remember that man's labor is personal and necessary for him and must therefore be regarded as-retaining
the substance of a natural right, which is always permanent
and inviolable. 17
Again we have seen that man's rights ultimately depend
on his intrinsic worthiness as a human person with consequent
obligations to fulfill the needs of his personality.

As soon

as we admit man's dignity, we are naturally led to the admission of certain fundamental rights, such as the right to
life, to own property, and to work for a living wage.

Since

these rights are based on the foundation of man's essence,
16 John A. Ryan, "A Living Wage by Law," Readings in Ethics,
edited by J. F. Leibell. Loyola University Press, Chicago,
1926, 691-692.
17 Pope Leo XIII, "Rerum Novarum, fI Social Wellsprings, Vol. I,
edited by Joseph Huss1ein, S.J., Bruce Publishing Co., Milwaukee, 1943, 193.
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they must be regarded as inherent possessions that cannot be
taken away from him without disturbing the very order of
nature.
The second specific right that all men have is the right
to liberty, which may be personal or social.
The most basic aspect of man's right to oersoanl liberty
comes from the fact that he is directed and tends by the nature of his being to a supernatural end.

He has the obliga-

tion and therefore the right to worship God and to strive
for his eternal destiny in God.

Upon this rjght depends the

ultimate satisfaction and perfection of man's human personality.

Religion, considered as a moral virtue, that gives

God the honor He deserves, surpasses all other moral virtues
because it alone is ordained directly and immediately to God
as to its end. 18

If we ask whether man is free to determine

how he shall practice religion, we must reply that objectively
he has freedom to practice only the true religion, but that
subjectively he must follow the dictates of his conscience. 19

18 Summa, II-II, 81,5-6.
19 St Thomas was very strict towards those who, once knowing
Truth, leave it. Ibid., 11-11,11, 3; 10, 8, 11, 12. On the
other hand, he forcefully protects the freedom of conscience
of non-believers. Ibid., I-II, 19,5. For Catholics who are
commanded by ecclesiastical authority to perform acts that
violate the moral law or are opposed to their own mor~n convictions, St. Thomas claims that they must die under the sentence of excommunication rather than disobey "the truth of
life, It which may never be sacrificed. Ibid., II-II, 104,
1, ad 1; 5.
----

..

The second aspect of personal liberty is that of the
right to self-development, which includes the development of
the whole man, his physical, intellectual, and moral traits.
Since man has an inherent duty to develop his faculties of
mind and will (first according to their needs and t he needs
of his whole person; secondly according to their capacities
to receive development), he must enjoy the means necessary
for that development; these means are secured only by a corresponding right.
A third personal right is that of marriage and family
life.

Not every man has the obligation towards which this

right of marriage and family life looks.

We may distinguish

between a purely personal right which pertains to the person
as an individual and a specific right which belongs to the
whole species as benefitting the species as such.

The for-

mer right has a corresponding unconditional obligation, but
the specific right is not accompanied by this obligation,
even though the right is exercised only by the individua1. 20
The right to marriage is based on man's natural inclination
or need for an act which tends primarily to the perfection
of the species and only secondarily to the perfection of the
individual.

Thus, not all men will enjoy the use of this

right, because not all men have the obligation correlative
to it.
20

The right to family life "includes the right to

Ibid., II-II, 49,2; 152,2, ad 1; 5.
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security and the preservation of a certain economic stability,
4i

the right to growth, the right to have children, and the
right to provide for their physical and spiritual welfare. ,,21
No one, not even the State, may deny a man the exercise of
these rights to family life and to marriage unless there is
a reasonable and grave reason directed to the common good
that demands such interference.
The final type of nersonal right concerns the right of
physical freedom.

Since man needs to be physically free in

order to satisfy his obligations towards himself and his
family and in order to protect his rights and those of his
family, he has a natural right to this freedom.

This means

that no man may have a direct dominion over him, nor an indirect dominion ,unless he wills it or unless the dominator
acting for the State, holds him in punishment for crime or
as a prisoner of war.22
Besides his personal rights to liberty man also possesses
social rights, among which are his political, civic, and
communal rights.
Man's social rights accrue to him by reason of his essentially social nature.
gl-Me¥e~l-!t~-Qit.,

The community is rooted in man's

487.

22' Since the problem of slavery as defined and explained by
St. Thomas (II-II, lO,lO,ad 3; 57, 3, ad 2; 189,6 ad 2), is
not entirely clear, the reader is urged to confer rlinston 11.
Ashley's thesis, "The Theory of ITatural Slavery according to
Aristotle and st. Thomas." Ph. D., University of notre Dame,
Notre Dame, Indiana, 1941.

for the common welfare the subjects
of the territory are bound to submit
to it. They are not free to withdraw assent or obedience. 25
However, we admit that the subjects of any government always
have the power to designate their form of government and to
agitate for a change in form if it would actually promote
their welfare; in this case the existing p;overnment must cooperate for the benefit of the citizens.

In a democracy,

such as the United states, the government must aim

~

r people-

participation in government and a free distr-ibutlon of the
franchise so that all the competent citizens may have a voice
in the elections of officials.

In regard to the right to

vote the State must see that it is so regulated '''that public
order and peace will be preserved, that the natural rights
of ?oIl will be protected and that all will have equal opportunity.tl26

In like manner the State must make laws and re-

gulations concerning the fitness of

p~blic

officials so that

the welfare of all citizens will be considered.

The rights

to vote and to hold office will be justly limited and defined
by the State, but always for the common good and for the ultimate protection of the most fundamental rights of all.
1\~an's

civic rights concern his relationship to his imme-

diate community; they include the many protections such as
the rights to making contracts, to trial by jury, to equal
25
26

QE. cit., 175-l76.
Ibid., 177.

benefits of public service.
4i

Man's conununal rights concern his recreational, cultural,
educational, and purely social needs.

These particular civic

and communal rights devend upon the State's obligation to
practice distributive justice, which will mainly concern itself with seeing that substantial equality is always observed.
'rhus, if wi thin the State certain indivio_uals or groups, because of poverty or weakness, have special needs, the State
is bound to fulfill these needs in so far as the common welfare will permit.

The main reason for this special consid-

eration of the poor and helpless members of society is that
"the richer population have many ways of protecting themselves, and stand less in need of help from the State; those
who are badly off have no resources of their own to fall back
upon, and must chiefly rely upon the
State." 27

assi~tance

of the

An example of how distributive justice puts a de-

mand on the State in this regard is the univ ersal right in
the United States for ordinary educational opportunities.
All

citi~ens

must receive the same chance for an elementary

and secondary education; for the State to deprive certairi
persons of this chance without sufficient reasons is to commit a grave injustice against those persons.

And for the

State to deal unfavorably towards those who need educational
opportunities more than others is a greater act of injustice.
27

Pope Leo XIII, "Rerum Novarum," 189.

The State is obliged, however, to set up institutions of
~

higher education only in so far as the capacities of its members demand such institutions.
Although in considering man as a aocial being we have
noted how he must depend on the State or community for the
satisfaction of his social needs, we must remember that the
ultimate perfection of only one man surpasses the natural good
of the entire State or community.

Man is naturally social,

but he is first of all a person; he has rights that in themselves supersede those of the State and must be protected and
respected by the State.
Man's final specjfic right, the pursuit of happiness,
concerns itself with goods and nrivil eges "above tre minimum."
The peculiar needs, capacities, and abilities of individuals
will determine their rights to such pursuits as to seek employment in a variety of businesses, to seEk promotion, to
seek higher wages or salaries, higher education, to possess
an equal share of luxury goods as they become more common to
all members of society; in a word, to progress as the majority
do, and to receive the common rewards of such progress. 28
With the development of civilization new rights ensue, so
that "individuals who contribute to the progress of the common
good may share in the benefits," with the freedom of opportunity due them. 29

In the United States, where material

28 LaFarge, Ope cit., 91 (quotations of Francis Gilligan at
Twenty-First National Conference of Catholic Charities).
29 Loc. cit.

..

development and progress have become connotative of its spirit,
special care must be taken by communities, states, and the
nation at large to see that no individuals or groups are kept
from enjoying the fruits of this spirit.
The racial situation in the United states furnishes an
extensive field for the application of the principles outlined according to man's rights to life, to liberty, and to
the pursuit of happiness.

All men can lay claim to these

three fundamental rights, unless they have deliberately sacrificed their claim.

The accidental color of one's skin

(which accident has given birth to the word, "race") or the
accidental traits and characteristics arising from one's physical or social development 'have nothing to do with the principles or the application of the principles of justice and
the doctrine of human rights.

Human personality is the sub-

stance of man; the color of his skin is a very accidental mark
of him.

All man's rights flow from his substantial being;

that is why they are called "human rights," and not American
rights, or white rights, or red-haired-persons' rights.
We have said that human rights are substantially equal
in all men.

In application, however, we insist that when

there is a conflict of rights -- not in rights in se, but in
rights as possessed by this or that individual

then empha-

sis must be placed on the rights of the weak, the poor, the
unportected persons whose rights are more apt to be disregarded

and even violated.

These persons need their rights in order
4i

to fulfill the obligations demanded by their human persons.
Thus, in practice, in the United States the rights of the
Negro population group will frequently supers ere those of white
men.

If, for example, certain white men find

perso~al

happi-

ness only when they are separated from Negroes, whom they
have been taught to dislike, and if this discomfort actually
conflicts with a Negro's, right to work or to receive an education, or to preserve freedom of worship, then the Negro's
right must be held as superior.

Since in this country the

white men control the organic resources, education, industry,
commerce, and recreation, it must be the special duty of the
governmental authorities to'protect the rights of the Negro
citizens.

One of the States most necessary duties is to keep

unprejudiced the minds of the youth in the country, so that
they will never stamp as inferior any of their fellow Americans, who happen to be Negroes, but who are like themselves
human persons.
Here, then, is the crux of the "other half" of the Scholastic answer to the race question in the United States.

We

call this the ethical argument; it carries conviction because
it is firmly rooted in the metaphysical argument.

The solu-

tion to the race problemmust base itself on the admission and
consequent application of these philosophical principles.
is outside the realm of philosophy to put these principles

It

into practical action; the philosopher directs, while the so-

.,

ciologists and social workers, the educators and religious
teachers work.

Of course the first step that the workers must!

take is the propagation of true principles; they must inform
before they can reform; they must present Truth to intellects
if they expect Good to come from wills.

Any other answer,

as we shall immediately see, fails in its initial error of
neglecting or abusing the truths of the basic foundation
man's essential dignity as a human person -- and of the ultimate principle -- the doctrine of human rights •.

CHAPTER V
THE

tI

OTHER ANSWERS fI ANSWERED

The negative approach as a solution to a problem must
always remain secondary.

If the positive doctrine cannot be

substantiated, an appeal to "answers to objectors" will never
fully

s~tisfy

the reasonable inquirer.

Although we have of-

fered positive doctrine as proof of the Scholastic answer to
the race question, we have a corroborative argument in our
answers to the various solutions proposed by "the other side."
Besides its service as the handmaid of positive doctrine this
negative approach has an important and necessary role to play
in revealing the errors of philosophers and social thinkers
who carry great weight in the world today •. The devastating
effects of Nazism and Communism have been shown to all the
world, but the dangerous half-truths and vestiges of untruth
that take subtler forms are not sufficiently known.

It is

our purpose here to disclose not only the philosophical systems in their bold rejection of those truths upon which the
welfare of man and society rests, but the false principles
of less pretentious systems which are perhaps more dangerous
because they wear masks of "sweet reasonableness" that easily
deceive the unwary student.
89

.,

To answer the various philosophers interested in the race
question is a difficult task, because often it is next to impossible to get on a common ground of understanding.

There-

fore, we have found it necessary to analyze these "other answers lt in the light of Scholastic principles and to show how
these answers oppose the values naturally determined by human
reason and thus destroy the basic foundation and the ultimate
principle without which we will never arrive at a true understanding of Negro-White relationships in the United states.
The doctrines of the philosophers and social thinkers
presented in the first chapter of this thesis will not be considered individually but will be analyzed under the four general divisions suggested as reasonable: 1) the postulate of an
absolute; 2) the meaning of man; 3) the relation of man to
other men; 4) the value of these doctrines as an answer to the
race question.
1) The postulate of an absolute.
Every system of philosophy must have its to absolutum,
because the very nature of philosophy is to seek ultimate
causes, which in turn implies that there will be the ultimate
cause, the absolute, beyond whicb nothing can be and towards
which everything must tend.

Scholastic philosophy admits one

Absolute, the true Absolute: God, the Supreme Being of onto}ogy, the Provident Creator of theodicy, the only true Absolute of all true philosophy.

Since God is what He is, any

.

lower being set up as a rival of Him is a blasphemous caricature, and any human endeavor that neglects Him in a search
for truth has already pronounced its own death sentence.
The totalitarian philosophies of Communism, Fascism, and
Nazism have taken as their absolutes a particular collectivity.
The definite form of the absolute differed according to the
historical, political, and social-economic causes aggravating
the birth of the new absolute.

In Russia the absolute became

the proletarian class; in Italy, the state; in Germany, the
Aryan race. l
Contrary to the dictates of human reason the totalitarian
systems have claimed personality for their class, State, or

.

race, which they portray as t1a mysterious being outside and
above the individuals of whom it is composed, a kind of divinity informing them, by means of collective coercion, with a
potentiality foreign to their nature."2

To represent a so-

.cial group or "collective whole" alone as real and the individuals that compose the group as valueless apart from the
---~---------------

1 It is a special study in itself to trace the historical evo
lution of totalitarianism as it has existed in Russia, Italy,
and Germany. Complete references to this stu~y are found in
Religion and the Modern State, Christopher Dawson, Sheed and
Ward, New Yor~1936; The Metaphysical Relation Between Person
and Liberty, Rudolf John Harvey, The Catholic University of
America Press, Washington, 1942; Selfishness and the Social Or
~, John J. Reardon, The Catholic University of America Press,
WAshington, 1943.
2 Luigi Sturzo. The True Life. st. Anthony Guild Press, Pater
son, New Jersey, 'I'943-;3':" - -

group is the,reversal of truth.

Dr. O'Toole states:
I

Absolutely speaking, the individual
alone is real, whereas collections
(classes, groups) are mental constructs, which, far from having any
absolute extramental reality, do
not even admit of realization outside the mind. Actually, a collection is not a single being, but a
multitude of distinct individual
realities whose sole unity is a
logical or conceptual oneness ascribed to them by the mind. Collections are not real wholes but logi~
cal ones. This misplacement of emphasis that attaches importance to
the unreal collection rather than
to the real individuals mentally
collected into a group, is an error •••• 3
It is this unreal collection that becomes the Summum Bonum of
totalitarianism.

Thus, Russia is class-centric; Italy, State-

centric; Germany, race-centric; just as all true philosophy
is theo-centric.
Although we cannot prove that the totalitarian absolutes
totally emerged one from the other, we can note the philosophical de-purification they underwent: from the more universal
to the more particular group of men, from the material principle of economic security and prosperity to political loyalty
and civic dependence and then to physical well-being and pureblood worship.
terial usurper.

In each stage God is replaced with a more maThe last of the line deserves special mention

because it is the race philosophy par excellence.
3 George Barry O'Toole. ttThe Pantheism Latent in Totalital?ian
Absolutism, tt Race: Nation: Person,- 308.

Racism is the lowest possible form of pseudo-absolutism •

•

Besides being based on the false assumption that a collection
of individuals equals a being with personality, it errs in
presupposing tbat men of tlpure-blood rt equals a collection.
Science has no answer to the question, "What is racial purity
and Durity of blood?t'
race in adequate terms.

In fact, science cannot even def-ine
Yet, if we could admit that there can

be a pure-blood race, still we would have to prove that mixture of pure-blood with non-pure-blood constitutes in itself
a blemish or cause of moral or physical weakness.

(The oppo-

site of this statement can be shown by the fact that blood
relationship mas frequently been the cause of physical degeneration, while blood mixture has seemed to improve the rat

cial stock.)

But tf it were proven that blood mixture is an

evil, the problem of right and wrong would not be changed,
since marriage and procreation are faculties attaching to the
very nature of man and are thereby dependent on man's judgment in accordance with the objectively true order of things.
It is unfair to class all white-supremists in the United
States as complete racists, since they do not set up a whole
race philosophy, making their own race (used in the broad
sense of the term) the absolute of life.

We must state, how-

ever, that tbe theories of white-supremacy are irrational and
if carried out logically and far enough will lead inevitably
to a race-philosophy no less subversive than that of the

National Socialists in Germany.

Any attempt to upset the ordo

•

rerum is a threat to the supremacy of God, and the whitesupremists are guilty of perverting this order when they subscribe to any doctrine or practice that admits or implies that
certain members of the human race are inferior or tainted in
their natures.
The irrationalists have no peculiar race philosophy of
their own, but they are forced to revert to the conclusion:
matter is the true absolute.

For the irrationalists it is not

the pure-blood of one grou-p but the animality of ,all men that
determines value.

The materialistic scientists begin with

the animal part of man and end with it.

The zoological psy-

chologists begin with the animal part of man and try to spiritualize it by immersing it in the "world soul," which can
easily develop into a totalitarian philosophy of one sort or
another.
The false social philosophers admit the necessity of a
totalitarian philosophy, but they condemn the restricting
elements of Communism, Fascism, and Racism; they want a place
for all men in one all-absorbing unity through common and absolute equality.

Stnce men must be equal in something, these

social philosophers would have men equal in Humanity or Society.
Him."

They have said, "Since God. does not exist, we must invent
Thus, another pseudo-absolute is born.
Two special variations of the "old line tl social

philosophers have arisen recently in the United States.

Two

•

groups, both very interested in the problem of Negro-White
relationships, have offered their solutions as the only ones
satisfying the ideals of mankind and at the same time fulfilling the particular needs of the problem in the United
States.
The first group calls their program liThe City of Man,"
which is closely alligned with the false social philosophers'
pseudo-absolute, Society.

Here God is dethroned to give place

to the Universal Democracy, which is humanity-centric.
concretely, in the "City of

T',~antl

Taken

the foundation of law 1s a

universal participation in government; the foundation of equality is that the state is the agent of collective human
purposes; the foundation of justice in democracy as a community of persons.

But ultimately "The City of Han" rests on the

untrue assumption that God is gl"l.ren being by men and that men
trace their origin to the unreal

col~

ctivity, Humanity.

The second group is headed by the sociologists, Dr. Gunnar Myrdal, who has collected a mass of valuable and interesting facts and has preaented these facts in a scholarly form.
Dr. Myrdal inslsts in his introduction that as a sociologist
his purpose is not to philosophize, not to make value judgments, still in his first chapter he proceeds to prove that
the race question in the United States is a moral problem
which can be solved only by Americans resolving to submit

themselves completely to the "American Creed."

Thus, he im~

plies that creed is the objective norm of morality against
which he measures all his findings; thus, his judgments, tending to a solution of the American Dilemma, are given value
only in so far as they are related to the creed.

Dr. Myrdal

claims that he is not interested in whether the creed is
right or wrong, since he has no personal value judgments of
such things.

But by defining the creed as he does he implies

that there is nothing more ultimate or more absolute according
to which the creed has objective valUEr and upon which the
creed depends for its being what it claims to be.

Dr. Myrdal,

therefore, has presented to the American people the "true absolute"

the ttAmerican Cr~ed.tt4

It is easy to discover the reason for Dr. Myrdal's creation of a new pseudo-absolute.
ginning.

He dld not begin at the be-

Instead of going immediately to the true sources of

the creed, where a true definition will be found in objective
terms, he discovered sources of his own.

Instead of defining

the creed according to the concise words of the Declaration
of Independence and the Constitution of the United states, and
thus exploring the sources for the concepts expressed there,
he says that it is the sum of the ideals which "represent to
the American people the essential meaning of the nation's
4 It is interesting to note that Dr. Hyrdal always capitalizes the words, "American Creed", which indicates a kind of
personalization of the concept.

Q7

early struggle for independence.,,5

The tenets of the creed

.,

are outlined as a kind of emergence from the philosophy of
the Enlightenment, the theology of sectarian Protestant

Chris~

tianity, and the terminology of English law, all of Which in
themselves claim ancestry from a Ifcommon democratic creed as
it matured in our common Western civilization. ,,6
Dr. Myrdal misrepresents the American creed; first, according to its origin; secondly, according to its essence.
In writing of the origin of the creed Dr. Myrdal reveals
his philosophical prejudices.

Contrary to its name, the

period of the Enlightenment by its avowed rejection of the
supremacy of God and the primacy of the natural law as founded
on the eternal law ushered in an age of darkness.

It was the

Enlightenment that displaced obedience to divine authority
with the independence of man as a law unto himself; from this
complete break with objective authority resulted an independent morality which brought with it a boundless license and
eventual denial of the validity of human reason.

If the Ameri

can creed stems from this period of darkness, then it is
worthless as a norm of morality, since it will be based on a
philosophy that forbids any objective

~orm

of morality.

Pro-

testant Christianity is as unworthy a parent; it was founded
on a spirit of independence that fostered subjective claims
5
6

Myrdal, 2£. cit., 4.
Ibid., 25.

in preference to divine revelation.

English law may be con~

sidered trustworthy in so f·ar as it followed its traditional
dependence on the unchangeable natural and divine positive
law, but it too became errant when it gave way to individualistic adaptations and inconsistent exceptions that made law
the pawn of majority opinion, of brute force, or of materialistic expediency.'

It is fortunate for the lJni ted States

that Dr. Myrdal errs when he states that the American creed
has its foundation in these three sources.
The truth of the matter is that Dr. Myrdal has confused
the temporal background of

~

truth with the truth itself.

Even if the framers of the Declaration and Constitution were
for the most part influenced by Locke's Two Treatises, and
even by some phases of their Protestant faith and some tenets
rooted in English law, still the creed is not more or less
true for all that.

For one searching out the truth behind

the American creed these factors serve only as scenery and
temporary back-drops of more basic and more universal truths. 7

7

It should be known, for example, that John Locke, to whom
historians trace Jefferson's statement of sovereignty, was refuting the Patriarcha of Sir Robert Filmer, who in turn wrote
his own work as a condemnation of St. Robert Bellarmine's De
Laic is. It can also be proven that Jeffers·::m had in in his
library not only the writings of John Locke, but also those of
Filmer and Algernon Sidney, who opposed Filmer even before
Locke did. Had Jefferson taken an interest in original sources
-- a fact we cannot doubt -- he would have been able to get
Bellarmine's work at the Princeton Library. Bellarmine was
the true secondary source of Jefferson's statement of sovereignty. Vd., John Clement Rager. ~olitical Philosophy of Blessed Cardinal Bellarmine. Catholic University of America Press,

The American Declaration and Const1tution are only temporal
expressions of eternal verities.

The American creed fs not

true and credible because it is American; rather, because it
is not American but universal and eternal and rooted in the
true Absolute ( a fact that Dr. Hyrdal nowhere expresses or
even implies), it is true and credible and naturally acceptable to mankind.

Thus, in essence the creed is not an abso-

lute, nor does it, as expressed in its official documents,
claim to be so.

It is Dr. Myrdal, who wO\lld endow it with

that spurious essence and thus destroy its efficiency as an
instrument for solving the problem of race relations.
2) The meaning of man.
When totalitarian philosophies dethrone God they must
logically destroy the individual personalities of men, who
become necessarily submerged parts of the social community.8
This depersonalization of man is the consequence of their personalizing the class, the state, or the race.

By giving per-

sonality to a purely intra-mental concept they destroy the
essences of those real beings who are satd to be fused into
this conceptual existence.

The mode of fusion depends on the

pseudo-absolute set up.
Since the guiding principle of Communism is the greater
productlon and distribution of material goods for the phYSical
well~being

8

of a classless society, man's spiritual faculties

Reardon, £Ee cit., 140-141.

are neglected if not completely denied; his dignity becomes
~

the reflected glory of the one class; his immortality, its
immortal i ty •
Statism makes man the tool of the State, a society in
which no individual man can say "we," as he does of his family,
but only "it."9
In the racist's society men's endowments are conditioned
by the physical characteristics produced by "pure-blood. 1I
spiritual principles are degraded.

Ignoring man's essence

the racist chooses to exist in man's accidents.
,

All

.

I

He segregates himself within the
narrow family of those who bear
superficial likeness to him, and
professes to be. the offspring of
an animal. Proud of his blood and
other physical characteristics,
which he shares with the rest of
the animal kingdom, he spurns the
incommensurate dignity with which
the Almighty Creator gratuitously
vested him. 10
The racist, if he is consistent, must base the dignity of man
on a completely materialistic principle; he must lower man to
a brute level, not only other men but himself included.

There

is no way by which human dignity can be limited to any single
category of men without at the same time making all men irrational.

Concerning the nature of man ( the universal term

··for t'all men") there can be no compromise; reason demands one
response and no other.
9 Fulton J. Sheen. Freedom Under God. Bruce Publishing Co.,
Milwaukee, 1940, 137.
1

i

There is no practical difference between the conclusions

.,

of the totalitarians and the principles of the irrationalists.
To begin with totalitarian ethics is to end with irrational
metaphysics; to begin with irrational metaphysics is to end
with some form of totalitarian ethics.
The false social philosophers, including the "City of Man'
group, widen the totalitarian horizon by directing man's existence to an all-embracing mass entity.

For them everything

must be within, nothing against, nothing outside humanity or
society.

They explicitl'y deny that every human being is an

individual who is in command of his own life for his own
supreme purpose and who can use things about him but can be
used by nothing else in the universe.
means to a communal end.

Here man is made the

tlHe exists," as Father Farrell

states, "not for his own goal, but for the goal of that vague
community called humanity; he is the necessary ally of some
vague power; he has no liberty but to hold fast to that nonpersonal end that renders his life individually meaningless. nIl
This philosophy of man as an impersonal cog in a great machine
is the logical result of a philosophy that has replaced the
true Absolute with a "blasphemous caricature. 1I
In Dr. Myrdal's writings the meaning of man is as confused as his description of the American creed.

He implies

11 Walter Farrell, tlBook Review of City of Man," The Thomist,
III, #4, October 1941, 662-663.

by neglecting to clarify the prima principia that man's worth

•

proceeds from his adherence to the ideals presented by the
creed, which is given a kind of absolute essence.

By referri

to the tlEnlightenment" of the "Creed tl Dr. Myrdal implies the
denial of man's spiritual soul with spiritual faculties which
'-

give man the power and dignity of a person.
3)

The relation of man to other men.
The Scholastic doctrine of human. rights is based on the

proximate foundation man's essential dignity as a human person
and on the remote foundation of the true Absolute, God.

Since

the various philosophies we have reviewed deny these two foundations it will be impossible for them to accept this further
development.

The truths of Scholastic position are built up

like a great cathedral: everything has its place, at peace,
and in harmony.

Contrary to these truths the creators of

pseudo-absolutes attempt to use sand for stones; always there
is chaos and confusion.
In the totalitarian systems men receive their rights from.
the group to which they belong; they have no obligations towards a higher power; their obligations towards other men of
their group are on the basis of their mutual relationship to
the group and not to one another.

Stealing from a neighbor,

for example, is wrong because a neighbor is a member of the
class or state or race, and it is the group that suffers the
loss.

In a society of this kind there is absolute equality

between the members.

..

But it is the equality of slaves who are

bound to the same master.

Then, too, equality extends only

to one group of men, not to all men.

Caucasians, for example,

may be judged by them to be totally superior to all other races.

Thus the Aryan racists taught that "the races of mankind

differ so greatly from one another, by virtue of their innate
and inalterable character, that the lowest of them is farther
removed from the highest than it is from the highest species
of brutes. tl12

The totalitarian, and more especially the ra-

cist, commits a singularly embarrassing blunder.
the generic concept of

~lman

By confusing

dignity with the entity of his

own particular race he degrades to the level of animal life,
not only other men but also himself with his "pure fl confreres;
he annuls in his own mind the very dignity which he wishes to
monoDOlize. 13

They would leave all men with no dignity and

consequently with no rights.
For the false social philosophers equality is not the
result of men's personality-likenesses, but the unity of one
man to another in humanity.

Justice, therefore, does not pro-

ceed from the virtue of man who performs his obligations ·dictated by the necessities of his human nature, but comes from
a democracy as a community of people who, happenoto be living
together.
12
13

The fundamental difference between this belief and

Race: Nation: Person, vii.
Achille, loco cit., 109.

.

true doctrine is that human rights must flow from the very
nature of man as a human person; they must be intrinsic to
him.

These other phllosouhles would draw man's freedom from

its source in the universal ana total democracy; thus they
make the principle of man's freedom something outside and extrinsic to him; freedom exists, therefo"'."'e, not for man as his
own natural characteristic, but to the eno that man may work
to t,he end beyond himself which is wi thin· humanity.

In this

system humanity or society will determine rights and duties,
which are necessarily temporary, mutable, violable grants of
an extrinsic order.

Based on such fragile Drinciples man-

will soon become the vassal of an- irrational despot.
If D'r'. Myrdal wishes his readers to believe that Americans have rights and obligations towards one another

solel~

because their American creed has granted theII' , then Americans
have not the inalienable rights they claim.

For a right to

be inalienable it must come from an antecedent obligation that
is determined by the need of the person who will claim the
right; t.hen too the right must ult.imately proceed from the
Absolute Being, who has ordered the needs of man to a purposeful end.

Rights and obligations must be intrinsically a part

of man; otherwise they are superimposed and contrary to his
rational nature.

Dr. Myrdal destroys the force and essence

of human rights by refusing to found them as intrinsic parts
of human nature, which is in turn maoe in the image of God.

· 10'"'

.

Only firmly established concepts can assure harmonious relationships between men.

Ethical principles must be set down

explicitly and definitely.

To call the race question a "moral

question" and then to clefine morality as the conflict between
"moral valuations on various levels of consciousness and generality," that is, "the valuations nreserved on the general
plane which we shall call the

~American

Creed- .•• and, on ·the

otber hand, the valuations of specific planes of individual
and group.living,,,l4 is to confuse the issue rather than solve
it.

There must be a recall of basic postulates and a defini-

tion of objective terms; there must be a return to reason.
walter Lippmann says that philosophers must look to the traditional viewpoint of

weste~n

civilization; he writes:

The institutions of the western
world were formed by men who
learned to regard themselves as
invtolable nersons because they
were rational and free. They
meant by rational that they were
capable of comprehending the mor&
order of the universe and their
place in this moral order. They
meant wben they regarded themselves as free, that within that
order they had a personal moral
responsibility to perform their
duties and to exercise their corresponding rights. From this conception of the unity of mankind in
a rational order the western world
has derived its conception of law,
and that the cbaract.er of all particular laws is to be judged by
whether they conform to or violate,

----------------------

14

Myrdal, QE. cit •. , xliii.

approach to or depart from the rational order of the universe and
of man's nature. 15

4)

~-

The value of these doctrines as an answer to the race

question •.
For the totalitarian philosophies there is no "race prob1em"; in their own society, which is autonomous, men are identified and swallowed up by the class or state or race.

In the

Communistic community race means nothing; because of this fact
the Communist propagandists deceive many members of the oppressed races by describing the equality afforded all who
throw in their lots with the "classless society."

In the Fa-

cistic society race is usually identified with the members of
the State; consequently racial characteristics are soon lost
sight of, as long as all remain loyal to the absolute State.
In actual-fact, however, Fascistic states utilize national
patriotism by 'marking hostile racial groups as disloyal to the
State and therefore unworthy to be members; from here it is
an easy step to the fully developed race philosophy of "pureblood. "
In the specific "race society" everything is measured by
physical participation in the deified "pure-blood" group,
whether it be called Aryan or Caucasian or any other racial
type.

The race problem is the only problem in such a society.

Family life, education, recreation, national culture are
i5--wait~;;-Lipp~aT'tT't: "Man in American Education," Democra~,
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subordinated to safeguarding racial purity in individuals for
the "pure-blood" society.

The racist's solution is no' for

man but for certain men who have common animal characteristics.
Because the racist's philosophy insults the nature of man, his
dignity, and his rights, it must be driven from the earth as
the worst kind of moral plague.
Since the materialists deny the spiritual faculties of
man, they are forced to judge man as different types of animal
specimens.
cation.

For them race is a convenient means of classifi-

A~though

they would claim equality for men in their

common animality, practically they choose higher types of
soul-less men for their preferable bodily traits.

Haterialism

has always been the forerunner of an irrational degeneration
of men that easily gives birth to a kind' of totalitarian racism.

The materialists can never solve the race question by

their monistic conception of life.

The reality of spirit de-

mands admission first.
The "City of Man" philosophers believe that they have
found the solution for a true understanding between all groups
of men.

But, as we have proven, their solution is based on

untrue Iffirst principles. 11

Their efforts may be admirabl e,

but their purpose is predetermined to tragedy.

By rejecting

the established order of things they are led into chaos.

They

have yet to learn that truth is objective, that it is one and
final.

lOB

Dr. Myrdal was correct when he said that

~he

problem of
~

Negro-White relationships in the United States was a moral
issue.

But he was wrong when he defined what he meant by

"moral issue."

Until social thinkers, such as Dr •. Myrdal, de-

cide to set down certain primary truths as credible they will
never arrive at solutions of any social problem, least of all
one so complicated and so intimately connected with the private prejudices and social habits of Americans as the socalled "race problem. II

Social thinkers must learn to be ra-

dical,- in the orginal meaning of "radical" as "deeply rooted."
The Scholastic answer is radical, because it has its roots in
fundamental, immutable truths.

It alone of all the answerS

here given satisfies the demands of human reason, because it
alone defines the inalienable rights which all men possess as
human persons.
The full Scholastic answer has been given by a simple
presentation of its positive doctrine.

.A secondary, negative

proof has been given by the presentation and refutation of
all "other answers,~'

which enter the realm of philosophy.

It

is not the purpose of philosophy to follow up its program of
reason with practical techniques as applied to the daily lives
of men in society.

The adaptation of ,the "foundation" and

the "principle" to the acting lives of Americans
where the "true understanding ll ends.

begin~'

here
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